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Abstract
We show that the mutual information, in the sense of Kolmogorov complexity, of any pair of strings x and y is
equal, up to logarithmic precision, to the length of the longest shared secret key that two parties, one having x and
the complexity profile of the pair and the other one having y and the complexity profile of the pair, can establish via a
probabilistic protocol with interaction on a public channel. For ℓ > 2, the longest shared secret that can be established
from a tuple of strings (x1, ..., xℓ) by ℓ parties, each one having one component of the tuple and the complexity profile
of the tuple, is equal, up to logarithmic precision, to the complexity of the tuple minus the minimum communication
necessary for distributing the tuple to all parties. We establish the communication complexity of secret key agreement
protocols that produce a secret key of maximal length, for protocols with public randomness. We also show that if the
communication complexity drops below the established threshold, then only very short secret keys can be obtained.
Keywords: Kolmogorov complexity; mutual information; communication complexity; secret key agreement; infor-
mation inequalities; Ga´cs–Ko¨rner common information; information reconciliation
1 Introduction
Mutual information is a concept of central importance in both information theory (IT) and algorithmic information
theory (AIT), also known as Kolmogorov complexity. We show an interpretation of mutual information in AIT, which
links it to a basic notion in cryptography. Even though a similar interpretation was known in the IT framework, an
operational characterization of mutual information in AIT has been elusive till now.
To present our result, let us consider two strings x and y. It is common to draw a Venn-like diagram such as the
one in Figure 1 to visualize the information relations between them. As explained in the figure legend there are six
important regions. The regions (1) to (5) have a clear operational meaning. For instance, C(x) is the length of a
shortest program that prints x, C(x | y) is the length of a shortest program that prints x when y is given to it, and
so on. On the other hand, the mutual information I(x : y) from region (6) is defined by a formula: I(x : y) =
C(x) +C(y)−C(x, y). Intuitively, it is the information shared by x and y. But, is there an operational interpretation
of the mutual information? As mentioned above, we give a positive answer: The mutual information of x and y is
essentially equal to the length of a longest shared secret key that two parties, one having x and the other one having y,
and both parties also possessing the complexity profile of the two strings, can establish via a probabilistic protocol.
The following simple example illustrates the above concepts. Suppose that Alice and Bob want to agree on a
common secret key. If they could meet face-to-face, they could just generate such a key by, say, flipping a coin.
Unfortunately, they cannot meet in person and what makes the situation really troublesome is that they can only
∗A preliminary version of this work has been presented at 45thInternational Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP),
Prague, July 10-13, 2018.
†LIRMM, University of Montpellier & CNRS; on leave from IITP RAS. Email: andrei.romashchenko@lirmm.fr; supported in part by
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Figure 1: Two strings x and y, and their information. There are six regions that we distinguish: (1) The left solid circle
represents the information in x, as given by its Kolmogorov complexity, denoted C(x); (2) The right dotted circle
represents the information in y, denoted C(y); (3) The entire grey region (the two circles taken together) represents
the information in x and y, denoted C(x, y); (4) The light-grey region in the first circle represents the information in
x conditioned by y, denoted C(x | y); (5) The light-grey region in the second circle represents the information of y
conditioned by x, denotedC(y | x); and (6) the dark-grey region in the middle represents the mutual information of x
and y, denoted I(x : y).
communicate through a public channel. There is, however, a gleam of hope because Alice knows a random line x in
the affine plane over the finite field with 2n elements, and Bob knows a random point y on this line. The line x is
specified by the slope a and the intercept b and the point y by its two coordinates c and d. Therefore each of x and
y has 2n bits of information, but, because of the geometrical correlation, together they have 3n bits of information.
Thus, in principle, Alice and Bob share n bits. Can they use them to obtain a common secret key? The answer is yes:
Alice sends a to Bob, Bob, knowing that his point is on the line, finds x, and now they can use b as the secret key,
because the adversary has only seen a, and a and b are independent.
It may appear that the geometrical relation between x and y is crucial for the above solution. In fact it is just a red
herring and Alice and Bob can agree on a common secret key in a very general setting. To describe it, we consider
the scenario in which Alice has a random string x and Bob has a random string y. If x = y, then Alice and Bob
can use their common string as a secret key in an encryption scheme (such as the one-time pad) and achieve perfect
information-theoretical security. What happens if x and y are not equal but only correlated? Somewhat surprisingly,
for many interpretations of “correlated,” they can still agree on a shared secret key via interaction on a public channel
(for instances of this assertion, see [LYC76, BBR88, Mau93, AC93]). In this paper, we look at this phenomenon using
the very general framework of algorithmic information theory to measure the correlation of strings.
We proceed with a description of our results.
1.1 Our contributions
Characterization of mutual information. In a secret key agreement protocol, Alice and Bob, on input x and re-
spectively y, exchange messages and compute a common string that is random conditioned by the transcript of the
protocol. Such a string is said to be a shared secret key. Unless specified otherwise, we use protocols having the
following features:
(1) We assume that Alice and Bob also know how their x and y are correlated. In our setting this means that Alice
and Bob know the complexity profile of x and y, which, by definition, is the tuple (C(x), C(y), C(x, y)).
(2) The protocols are effective and randomized, meaning that Alice and Bob use probabilistic algorithms to com-
pute their messages.
Theorem 1.1 (Main Result, informal statement). 1. There is a secret key agreement protocol that, for every n-bit
strings x and y, allows Alice and Bob to compute with high probability a shared secret key of length equal to the
mutual information of x and y (up to an O(log n) additive term).
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2. No protocol can produce a longer shared secret key (up to an O(log n) additive term).
Secret key agreement for three or more parties. Mutual information is only defined for two strings, but secret
key agreement can be explored for the case of more strings. Let us consider again an example. Suppose that each
of Alice, Bob, and Charlie have a point in the affine plane over the finite field with 2n elements, and that the three
points, which we callA,B,C, are collinear. Thus, each party has 2n bits of information, but together they have 5n bits
of information, because given two points, the third one can be described with n bits. The parties want to establish a
common secret key, but they can only communicate by broadcastingmessages over a public channel. They can proceed
as follows. Alice will broadcast a string pA, Bob a string pB , and Charlie a string pC , such that each party using his/her
point and the received information will reconstruct the three collinear points A,B,C. A protocol that achieves this is
called an omniscience protocol because it spreads to everyone the information possessed at the beginning individually
by each party. In the next step, each party will compress the 5n bits, comprising the three points, to a string that
is random given pA, pB, pC . The compressed string is the common secret key. We will see that up to logarithmic
precision it has length 5n − (|pA| + |pB| + |pC |). Assuming we know how to do the omniscience protocol and the
compression step, this protocol produces a common secret key of length 5n − CO(A,B,C), where CO(A,B,C) is
the minimum communication for the omniscience task for the points A,B,C. In our example, it is clear that each
one of pA, pB, pC must be at least n bits long, and that any two of these strings must contain together at least 3n bits.
Using some recent results from the reference [Zim17], it can be shown that any numbers satisfying these constraints
can be used for the omniscience task. It follows that the smallest communication for omniscience is achieved when
|pA| = |pB| = |pC | = 1.5n, and thus the key has 5n− 4.5n = 0.5n bits. (Warning: in the entire discussion we ignore
additive terms of size O(log n).) We show that this holds in general. If ℓ parties have, respectively, one component of
a tuple (x1, . . . , xℓ) of n-bit strings, then up to O(log n) precision, they can produce a common secret key of length
C(x1, . . . , xℓ) − CO(x1, . . . , xℓ), where CO(x1, . . . , xℓ) is the minimum communication for the omniscience task
(which, as we show in the paper, depends only on the complexity profile of the tuple). The protocol that produces such
a key is probabilistic, and, as was the case for two strings, assumes that each party i has at the beginning of the protocol
besides its input string xi also the complexity profile of the entire tuple (x1, . . . , xℓ). We also show a matching (up to
O(log n)) upper bound, which holds for any number of rounds in the protocol.
Communication complexity for secret key agreement. In the protocol in Theorem 1.1, Alice and Bob exchange
min(C(x | y), C(y | x)) + O(log n) bits and obtain with high probability a shared secret key of length I(x :
y) − O(log n). In this protocol we can assume that Alice and Bob use either private random bits or public random
bits. We show that for the model with public random bits, the communication complexity of the protocol is optimal, in
the sense that in any protocol with public random bits there are input strings x and y, on which Alice and Bob have to
exchange at least min(C(x | y), C(y | x)) bits. In fact, our lower bound is stronger: we show that, for any constants
δ1, δ2 > 0, if Alice and Bob use a protocol with communication complexity (1−δ1)min(C(x | y), C(y | x)) for every
input pair x, y, then there are inputs for which the shared secret key that they obtain has length at most δ2I(x : y).
That is, if the communication complexity sinks below the threshold min(C(x | y), C(y | x)), then the size of the
common secret key drops to virtually zero. Finding the optimal communication complexity for the model with private
random bits remains an open problem.
1.2 Related previous work.
IT vs. AIT. Before reviewing existing related results in the IT and the AIT frameworks, it is useful to understand the
distinction between the two theories. In computer science the attribute random is mainly used in two (fairly different)
contexts: random processes and random objects. In short, IT, which we also call Shannon’s framework, focuses on
the former, whereas AIT, which we also call Kolmogorov’s framework, focuses on the latter. On the one hand, we
may think of an uncertain physical process with unpredictable outcomes, and employ the framework of the classic
probability theory (distributions, random variables, etc.). The notion of a random variable formalizes the idea of a
process like coin tossing. In this context we can measure the uncertainty of a random variable as a whole (by its
Shannon’s entropy, its min-entropy, etc.), but we cannot ask whether one specific outcome is random or not. On
the other hand, people use tables of random numbers, which are available as specific sequences of digits, written
on a disc or printed on a paper. The usefulness of such a table depends on its individual properties: frequencies of
3
digits, presence or absence of hidden regularities, compressibility, etc. The usual way to measure the uncertainty of
an individual string of digits is Kolmogorov complexity. In both contexts, the formal measures of randomness may
or may not involve computational complexity (see, e.g., different versions of pseudoentropy for distributions and the
resource bounded variants of Kolmogorov complexity for individual strings). These two formalizations of randomness
are connected but not interchangeable.
Both notions of randomness appear in cryptography. For example, in the one-time pad scheme, two parties share
a ‘random’ key that remains ‘secret’ for the attacker. It is common to use Shannon’s framework, and therefore the
notions of randomness and secrecy are defined in terms of random processes. In the ideal situation both parties
should have access to a common source of randomness, e.g., to the results of tossing an unbiased coin (hidden from
the adversary). By tossing this coin n times we get a random variable with maximal possible entropy, and thus, in
Shannon’s framework, the quality of randomness is perfect. But if by chance we obtain a sequence of n zeros, then
this specific one-time pad looks pretty useless in any practical application. However, Shannon’s information theory
provides no vocabulary to complain about this apparently non-random individual key. Antunes et al. [ALPS10]
suggested to use Kolmogorov complexity to measure the ‘secrecy’ of individual instances of a one-time pad or a secret
sharing schemes. We have in mind a similar motivation, and in this work a “secret key” is an individual string that is
random in the sense of Kolmogorov complexity.
Related work. We start with a brief account of works on secret key agreement in the IT setting. The secret key
agreement is a relatively well-studied problem in information theory, motivated, as the name suggests, by applications
in information-theoretically secure cryptography. Wyner [Wyn75] and Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [CK78] have analyzed
the possibility of obtaining a shared secret key in the case when one party sends to the other party a single message
on a channel from which the eavesdropper can obtain partial information. Maurer [Mau92, Mau93] considered the
case of protocols with several rounds of communication and showed that interaction can be more powerful than one-
way transmission. Ahlswede and Csisza´r [AC93] and Maurer [Mau93] have established the tight relation between
interactive secret key agreement and mutual information for memoryless sources. In the memoryless model, the input
data is given by two random variables (X1, X2) obtained by n independent draws from a joint distribution, where
Alice observes X1 and Bob observes X2. Informally stated, the references [Mau93, AC93] show that the longest
shared secret key that Alice and Bob can establish via an interactive protocol with an arbitrary number of rounds is
equal to the mutual information ofX1 andX2. Csisza´r and Narayan [CN04] go beyond the scenario with two parties,
and consider the case of an ℓ-memoryless source (X1, . . . , Xℓ) and ℓ parties, each one observing one component
of the tuple. They show that the longest shared secret key the ℓ parties can establish via an interactive protocol
with an arbitrary number of rounds is equal to the entropy H(X1, . . . , Xℓ) of the ℓ-memoryless source from which
one subtracts the minimum communication for omniscience. Their result holds also for stationary ergodic sources,
which generalize memoryless sources. As one can see, our results are very similar. They have been inspired by
the papers [AC93, Mau93, CN04] and represent the AIT analogue of the results presented above. As we explain in
Section 8.4, our results imply their IT analogues, and can be viewed as more general because they do not require the
memoryless or ergodicity properties of sources (in fact they do not require any generative model at all). The question
of finding the communication complexity of secret key agreement protocols in the IT framework has been raised by
Csisza´r and Narayan [CN04]. Tyagi [Tya13] has shown that for memoryless sources it is equal to the difference
between interactive common information in Wyner’s sense and mutual information. In Section 8.4 we explain how
Tyagi’s result compares to our results on communication complexity in the AIT framework.
Let us now say a few words about related results from the AIT world. To the best of our knowledge, in AIT there
has been no previous work on secret key agreement. However, the general idea of “materialization” of mutual infor-
mation was studied extensively. Motivated by the intuition that mutual information represents the amount of shared
information in two strings, researchers have explored the extent to which mutual information can be materialized more
or less effectively. The relevant concept is that of common information. Informally, a string z is a common information
string extracted from strings x and y, if z can be “computed” from x, and also from y, where “computed” is taken in a
more liberal sense that allows the utilization of a few help bits. In the most common setting of parameters, we require
that C(z | x) = O(log n) and C(z | y) = O(log n), where n is the length of x and y and the constant hidden in the
O(·) notation depends only on the universal machine. Informally, the common information of x and y is the length of
a longest common information string that can be extracted from x and y. It can be shown that up to logarithmic preci-
sion common information is upper bounded by mutual information. In an influential paper, Ga´cs and Ko¨rner [GK73]
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have constructed strings x and y for which the common information is much smaller than the mutual information.
Moreover, the property of a pair (x, y) of having common information equal to mutual information does not depend
solely on the complexity profile of x and y: There exist pairs (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) having the same complexity pro-
file, and for (x1, y1) the common information and mutual information are equal, whereas for (x2, y2) they are not.
Muchnik [Muc98] and Romashchenko [Rom00] have strengthened the Ga´cs-Ko¨rner theorem in significant ways, by
allowing a larger amount of help bits, parameterizing the mutual information of the constructed pair (x, y), and other
ways. Chernov et al. [CMR+02] presents alternative constructions of strings for which the common information is
smaller than mutual information for several regimes of parameters. A nice, self-contained and accessible exposition
of this research line can be found in the book of Shen, Vereshchagin and Uspensky [SUV17, Chapter 11].
Thus, previous work has shown negative results regarding the “materialization” of mutual information in AIT. As
far as we know, ours is the first positive result. In summary, we now know that computation without communication,
even enhanced with help bits, fails to extract the mutual information of two strings, while interactive computation
succeeds.
Our techniques. It is common for statements in IT (in the Shannon’s entropy framework) to have an analogous
version in AIT (in the Kolmogorov complexity framework). However, there is no canonical way to translate a result
from one setting to the other, and proofs of homologous results in these two frameworks can be drastically different.
A textbook example of this phenomenon is the chain rule: it is valid for Shannon’s entropy and for Kolmogorov
complexity, and the formal expressions of this rule in both frameworks look very similar. However, in Shannon’s case
this fact is an easy corollary of the definition, while in Kolmogorov’s version it requires a nontrivial argument (which
is known as the Kolmogorov–Levin theorem). There are more advanced examples of parallel properties (from IT and
AIT respectively), where the discrepancy between their proofs is even more striking.
This phenomenon manifests itself in this work as well. Our main results are motivated by similar ones in IT, and
there is a close resemblance of statements. As discussed above, this is not surprising. In what follows we explain the
relation between our proofs and the proofs of similar statements in Shannon’s framework.
The positive results (the existence of communication protocols) use constructions that at the high level are akin
to those from their IT counterparts [Mau93, AC93, CN04]. We employ a similar intuitive idea — manipulations
with “fingerprints” of appropriate lengths, see Section 3. However, the technical machinery is different. In the AIT
framework, for communication-efficient protocols, we need quite explicit constructions, while homologous results in
IT are usually proven by choosing random encodings. Our constructions are based on a combination of extractors and
universal hashing. Specifically, we use results from [BZ14] and [Zim17], where the “digital fingerprints” are obtained
by composing certain randomness extractors and universal hashing.
Our general protocols are not time-efficient, and this is to be expected given the high generality of the type of
data correlation in the AIT setting. However, for some particular types of correlation (e.g., for a pair of inputs with
a bounded Hamming distance), our protocols can be modified to run in polynomial-time. In this case, we use the
reconciliation technique from [Smi07, GS10, GS16].
In the negative results (upper bounds for the size of the common secret key, Theorems 4.1 and 5.5), the ideas from
IT do not help. The reason is that in the AIT framework the mutual information of various strings is not exactly zero but
only close to zero within some slack terms. The slack terms are small, but during the rounds of a protocol, the errors
can accumulate and grow beyond control (for more details see the discussion of the limits of the “weak” upper bound
in Section 3). To overcome this obstacle, we come up with a new type of inequalities for Kolmogorov complexity.
These inequalities are substantially different from the classic information inequalities used in the analogous results
in IT. This technique (Lemmas 4.6 and 5.10) is based on ideas similar to the conditional information inequalities
in [KR13, KRV15]. We believe that this technique can be helpful in other cases, including applications in IT (see
Section 8).
In the proof of a lower bound for communication complexity (Theorem 6.1), we use methods specific for AIT,
with no apparent parallel in IT. We adapt the technique of bounds for the size of common information that goes back
to An. Muchnik and use deep results regarding the contrast between mutual information and “extractable” common
information for stochastic for pairs of strings [She83, MR10, Raz11], which have not been previously employed in
information theory and communication complexity.
Roadmap. In Section 2 we present the necessary basic concepts and results in Kolmogorov complexity theory
used in this paper, and we formally define secret key agreement protocols. Section 3 is a warm-up section and contains
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a somewhat simplified version of the main result with a relatively short and self-contained proof. In Section 4 we
prove our main result. Section 5 contains the results on ℓ-parties secret key agreement protocols, for ℓ ≥ 3. Section 6
presents the results on the communication complexity of secret key agreement protocols. Section 7 contains the proofs
of some technical lemmas. We conclude with some loose-ends and final comments in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The basics of algorithmic information theory
Algorithmic Information Theory (AIT), initiated independently by Solomonoff [Sol64], Kolmogorov [Kol65], and
Chaitin [Cha66], is a counterpart to the Information Theory (IT), initiated by Shannon. While in IT, a string is the
realization of a random variable, AIT dispenses with the stochastic generative process, and defines the complexity of
an individual string x as the length of its shortest description. For example, the string
x1 = 00000000000000000000000000000000
has low complexity because it can be succinctly described as “25 zeros.” The string
x2 = 10110000010101110101010011011100
is a 32-bit string obtained using randomatmospheric noise (according to random.org), and has high complexity because
it does not have a short description.
Formally, given a Turing machineM , a string p is said to be a program (or a description) of a string x, if M on
input p prints x. We denote the length of a binary string x by |x|. The Kolmogorov complexity of x relative to the
Turing machineM is
CM (x) = min{|p| | p is a program for x relative toM}.
If U is universal Turing machine, then for every other Turing machineM there exists a stringm such that U(m, p) =
M(p) for all p, and therefore for every string x,
CU (x) ≤ CM (x) + |m|.
Thus, if we ignore the additive constant |m|, the Kolmogorov complexity of x relative to U is minimal. We fix a
universal Turing machine U , drop the subscript U in CU (·), and denote the complexity of x by C(x). We list below a
few basic facts about Kolmogorov complexity and introduce some notation:
1. For every string x, C(x) ≤ |x| + O(1), because a string x is trivially described by itself. (Formally, there is a
Turing machineM that, for every x, on input x prints x.)
2. Similarly to the complexity of x, we define the complexity of x conditioned by y as C(x | y) = min{|p| |
U on input p and y prints x}.
3. Using some standard computable pairing function 〈·, ·〉 that maps pairs of strings into single strings, we define
the complexity of a pair of strings by C(x, y) = C(〈x, y〉). Then we can extend this notation to tuples of larger
arity.
4. We use the convenient shorthand notation a ≤+ b to mean that a ≤ b + O(log n), where n is a parameter that
is clear from the context and the constant hidden in the O(·) notation depends on the universal machine U and
sometimes on some computable functions specified in the text, but not on a and b. Similarly, a ≥+ b means
a ≥ b−O(log n), and a =+ b means (a ≤+ b and a ≥+ b). In several places we use ≤+,=+,≥+ to indicate a
loss of precision of O(log(n/ǫ)) (instead of O(log n)), where ǫ is an additional parameter that is clear from the
context.
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5. The chain rule in information theory states that H(X,Y ) = H(X) + H(Y | X). A similar rule holds true in
algorithmic information theory: for all sufficiently long strings x and y,
∣∣C(x, y) − (C(x) + C(y | x))∣∣ ≤ 3(logC(x) + logC(y)). (1)
6. The mutual information of two strings x and y is denoted I(x : y), and is defined as I(x : y) = C(x) +C(y)−
C(x, y). The conditional mutual information is defined in the analogous way: I(x : y | z) = C(x | z) + C(y |
z) − C(x, y | z). It can be shown that mutual information is essentially non-negative (up to an additive term
O(logC(x, y))) and it satisfies the chain rule I(x, z : y) =+ I(z : y) + I(x : y | z) (here the n hidden in the
=+ ismax(|x|, |y|, |z|)).
7. The complexity profile of a tuple of strings (x1, . . . , xℓ) is given by the tuple consisting of the complexities of
all non-empty subsets of the strings in the tuple, i.e., it is the tuple (C(xV ) | V ⊆ [ℓ], V 6= ∅). We use here and
elsewhere in the paper the notation [ℓ] for the set {1, . . . , ℓ} and for an ℓ-tuple (x1, . . . , xℓ) and V a subset of
[ℓ], xV denotes the subtuple obtained by taking the components with indices in V (for example if V = {1, 2, 7}
then xV = (x1, x2, x7)).
8. The extended complexity profile of a tuple of strings is the tuple of all conditional and unconditional com-
plexities involving these strings. E.g., the extended complexity profile of a pair (x, y) consists of the values
C(x), C(y), C(x, y), C(x | y), C(y | x).
9. We use the following stronger variant, due to Bruno Bauwens [Bau18], of the main result from reference [Zim17].
It is a version of the Slepian-Wolf theorem about distributed compression of ℓ sources in the setting of Kol-
mogorov complexity.
Theorem 2.1 (Distributed compression of ℓ sources). For every constant positive integer ℓ, there exist a proba-
bilistic encoding algorithmsE and a decoding algorithmD such that for every n for every tuple of n-bit strings
(x1, . . . , xℓ) and for every tuple of integers (n1, . . . , nℓ),
• For every i ∈ [ℓ], E on input xi, ni and ǫ uses O(log(n/ǫ)) random bits and outputs a string pi of length
ni +O(log(n/ǫ)),
• For every string y, if the numbers ni satisfy the conditions
∑
i∈V ni ≥ C(xV | y, x[ℓ]−V ) for every
V ⊆ [ℓ], then the decoding algorithmD on input y and p1, . . . , pℓ reconstructs x1, . . . , xℓ with probability
1− ǫ, where the probability is over the randomness used by the encoding procedures.
The following is the particular case of the above theorem for ℓ = 1. A weaker version appeared in refer-
ence [BZ14].
Theorem 2.2 (Single source compression). There exists a probabilistic algorithm that on input x, k, ǫ, where x
is a string, k is a positive integer and ǫ > 0, returns a string p of length k + O(log(n/ǫ)), and for every y, if
k ≥ C(x | y), then with probability (1 − ǫ), p is a program for x given y. The algorithm is using O(log(n/ǫ))
random bits, where n is the length of x.
2.2 Shared secret keys and protocols for secret key agreement
Let k be a positive integer. A k-rounds two-party protocol for secret key agreement uses two computable functions A
and B and runs as follows. The first party has as input a string xA and uses private randomness rA, the second party
has as input a string xB and uses private randomness rB . We assume that the length of rA (rB) is determined by xA
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(respectively, xB). The protocol consists of the following calculations:
x1 = A(xA, rA)
y1 = B(xB , rB , x1)
x2 = A(xA, rA, y1)
y2 = B(xB , rB , x1, x2)
...
xk = A(xA, rA, y1, . . . , yk−1)
yk = B(xB , rB , x1, . . . , xk).
The algorithms A and B can handle inputs of different lengths. We also allow them to be partial (i.e., it is possible
that the protocol does not converge for some pairs of inputs). Let ǫ be a positive constant and δ(n) be a constant or a
slow growing function (e.g., O(log n)). A protocol succeeds with error probability ǫ and randomness deficiency δ(n)
on a pair (xA, xB) of n-bit strings if with probability (1− ǫ) over rA, rB ,
A(xA, rA, t) = B(xB , rB, t)
def.
= z, (2)
and
C(z | t) ≥ |z| − δ(n), (3)
where t = (x1, y1, . . . , xk, yk) is the transcript of the protocol.
The string z satisfying equation (2) and inequality (3) is called a shared secret key output by the protocol on input
(xA, xB). Note that the shared secret key z is a random variable since it depends not only on the inputs xA and xB ,
but also on the randomness rA and rB .
The number of rounds in a protocol (parameter k) may depend on the length of the inputs.
In words, Alice and Bob start with input strings xA and respectively xB , use private randomness rA, and respec-
tively rB and execute a protocol in which at round i, first Alice sends to Bob the string xi, and next Bob sends to
Alice the string yi, and at the end Alice and Bob separately compute with high probability a common string z (equa-
tion (2)) such that z is random even conditioned by the transcript of the protocol (inequality (3)). Thus, z is secret to
an adversary that has observed the protocol and consequently knows the transcript.
Remark 1. In our secret key agreement protocols, the inputs xA and xB have two components: xA = (x, hA) and
xB = (y, hB), where the strings x and y are the main components, while hA and hB are short helping strings (for
example, containing information about how x and y are correlated). The communication protocols designed in this
paper succeed for all input pairs xA and xB in which hA = hB = (the complexity profile of x and y). In case one or
both of hA and hB are not equal to the complexity profile, the protocols still halt on every input, but the outputs may
be meaningless.
Remark 2. In this paper we deal with uniform communication protocols: for inputs of all lengths Alice and Bob
compute their messages and the final results by using the same algorithms A and B. Our main results can be easily
extended to non-uniform protocols, with “custom-made” algorithms A and B for each length of inputs. In this setting
the technical statements of the theorems would be more cumbersome (we would need to add the description of the
protocol in the condition of all complexity terms, assuming that the protocol is known to the adversary; for details, see
Remarks 4, 13), though the adjustment of the proofs is quite straightforward.
3 Warm-up: Short proofs for “light”-versions of the main results
Our main result has two parts: the lower bound, which consists of a protocol that produces a shared secret key of
length equal (within logarithmic precision) to the mutual information of the inputs, and the upper bound, where we
show that it is impossible to obtain a longer shared secret key. We present here light versions of these two parts. We
call them light because they have weaker parameters than the full-fledged results, which are presented in Section 4.
On the other hand, they admit short and self-contained proofs. Moreover, since they have a common structure, these
proofs are a useful preamble for the proofs in the next section.
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The light lower bound consists of a protocol that does allow two parties, one having the n-bit string x and the
other having the n-bit string y, to obtain a shared secret key of length approximately equal to I(x : y), but which
communication-wise is inefficient. In Section 4 we present an improved protocol that achieves the same task, with
communication complexity equal essentially to min(C(x | y), C(y | x)), which we conjecture to be optimal (see
Section 6). The light upper bound consists of a proof in which we show that no protocol with a constant number of
rounds and poly(n) random bits can produce a secret key longer than the mutual information. In Section 4, we lift the
restrictions regarding the number of rounds and random bits.
The light lower bound.1 The setting is that Alice has the n-bit string x, and Bob has the n-bit string y. In
addition, both Alice and Bob have the complexity profile of x and y. We construct a protocol that allows Alice and
Bob to agree with probability 1− ǫ on a shared secret key of length I(x : y)−O(log(n/ǫ) and randomness deficiency
δ(n) = O(log(n/ǫ)). The protocol has 1 round, and actually the communication consists of a single message from
Alice to Bob.
We start with an overview of the proof in a “nutshell.” First, Alice chooses two hash-functions h1 and h2 from two
families of hash functions which are publicly known. Alice sends h1 and h2 to Bob, and she also sends to Bob the hash
value h1(x). Next, Bob attempts to reconstruct Alice’s input: he searches over all x
′ such that C(x′ | y) ≤ C(x | y)
until he finds a candidate with the same hash value, h1(x
′) = h1(x); in what follows he hopes that the x
′ he found is
indeed Alice’s string x. Next, Alice and Bob compute the value h2(x) and take it as the common secret key.
In this scheme the adversary gets to know the hash functions h1, h2 and the hash-value h1(x). For this to work,
we want to guarantee that with high probability Bob finds the correct value of x (absence of collisions) and that the
adversary gets very little information regarding the secret h2(x). The technical part of the proof consists in choosing
appropriate families of hash functions, which guarantee the two required properties.
In this section we use a very simple hashing technique — we take h1 and h2 to be random linear mappings with
suitable lengths of the output. In the next section we use Theorem 2.2, which provides a subtler implementation of the
same idea, where the ‘hashing’ is based on extractors.
In what follows we present in more detail the easy version of the protocol, with linear hashing.
Step 1: Let n1 = C(x) and let k = C(x | y). (In fact, Alice does not have k. But she can compute from the
complexity profile x and y, a good approximation of k; this is a small nuisance which can be easily handled, and for
the sake of simplicity we ignore it.) Alice chooses an n1 + log(1/ǫ)-by-n random binary matrix H . Alice partitions
H into two sub-matrices H1 and H2, where H1 consists of the top k + log(1/ǫ) rows of H , and H2 consists of the
bottom n1 − k rows of H . Alice calculates q = H1x, and sends q and the entire H to Bob. Let E1 be the event that
there exists x′ 6= x such that C(x′) ≤ C(x) and Hx′ = Hx and E2 be the event that there exists x′′ 6= x such that
C(x′′ | y) ≤ C(x | y) and H1x
′′ = H1x. Note that both E1 and E2 have probability at most ǫ. Consequently with
probability at least 1− 2ǫ, neither E1 nor E2 hold, an event that we assume henceforth. We also assume
C(x, y | H) ≥ C(x, y) −O(log(1/ǫ)), (4)
an event which holds with probability at least 1− ǫ.
Step 2: Since x is the unique string such H1x = q among strings that have complexity conditioned by y bounded
by k, Bob reconstructs x from q and H . Next, both Alice and Bob compute the string z = H2x, which is the output
of the protocol.
Let us now show that z has the desired properties. Note, first, that z has length n1 − k = C(x) − C(x | y) =
+
I(x : y). It remains to show that z is a shared secret key, i.e., that z is random conditioned by the transcript of the
protocol, which consists of q and H . More precisely, we show that C(z | q,H) ≥ I(x : y) − O(log(n/ǫ). Since x
can be computed from q, z andH ,
C(x, y | H) ≤ C(q, z, y | H) +O(1). (5)
Next, by the chain rule,
C(q, z, y | H) = C(q | H) + C(z | q,H) + C(y | q, z,H) +O(log n)
≤ C(x | y) + C(z | q,H) + C(y | x) +O(log(n/ǫ)).
(6)
1The following proof is due to Bruno Bauwens (private communication, August 2017).
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In the second line, we have taken into account that C(q | H) is less than |q| + O(1) = C(x | y) + log(1/ǫ) + O(1),
and C(y | q, z,H) is less than C(y | x) +O(1) (because x can be computed from q, z,H). Combining equations (5)
and (6), we obtain
C(z | q,H) ≥ C(x, y | H)− C(x | y)− C(y | x)−O(log(n/ǫ))
≥ C(x, y) − C(x | y)− C(y | x)−O(log(n/ǫ)) (using equation (4))
≥ I(x : y)−O(log(n/ǫ)).
Remark 3. The defined protocol has communication complexity O(n2) (mostly due to the necessity to communicate
the matrixH). The communication complexity of the protocol can be easily reduced toO(n) if we take at random, not
an arbitrary matrix H , but a random Toeplitz matrix of the same size. In the next section we describe a protocol with
communication complexitymin(C(x | y), C(y | x)). (We show in Section 6 that no protocol with public randomness
has smaller communication complexity, and we conjecture that the same holds for protocols with private randomness.)
The light upper bound. We show here that if k is a constant and the number of random bits is bounded by a
polynomial in n, no k-round protocol can produce a shared secret key that is longer (up to logarithmic precision)
than the mutual information of the inputs. More precisely, our claim is that if a shared secret key z is produced from
inputs xA, xB by some k-round protocol with probability 1 − ǫ, then C(z | t) ≤ I(xA : xB) + O(k log(n/ǫ)) with
probability 1−O(ǫ), where t is the transcript of the protocol.
Simple warm-up: deterministic protocols without communication. Let us first consider the case k = 0, i.e., Alice
and Bob do not interact, and also, for now, let us assume they use no randomness. Clearly, this model is very weak,
and, in general, Alice and Bob cannot agree on any nontrivial common secret without communication. However, in
some cases (for some very special inputs xA and xB) this might be possible. For instance, if xA and xB are n-bits
strings of complexity n, and the first n/2 bits in these strings coincide (the i-th bit of xA is equal to the i-th bit of xB
for i = 1, . . . , n/2), then Alice and Bob can take the first n/2 bits of their inputs as the common key.
In this trivial example, Alice and Bob get a common key of complexity close to n/2, and the mutual information
between xA and xB is also not less than n/2. We argue that the same relation remains true for all protocols without
communication, for all pairs of inputs (xA, xB). That is, if Alice and Bob can extract from their inputs xA and xB the
same string z without communication, then the complexity of this z is bounded by I(xA : xB). This follows from a
well-known inequality that is true for all xA, xB , z (see Lemma 7.8):
C(z) ≤+ C(z | xA) + C(z | xB) + I(xA : xB). (7)
Slightly more freedom: randomized protocols without communication. The same bound remains true if Alice and
Bob use random strings rA and rB (still without communication). Indeed, using Lemma 7.7 (3), with probability
1−O(ǫ), we have
I(xA, rA : xB , rB) = I(xA : xB)±O(log(n/ǫ)). (8)
Hence, we can apply the same argument to the pair (〈xA, rA〉, 〈xB , rB〉).
C(z) ≤+ C(z | xA, rA) + C(z | xB , rB) + I(xA, rA : xB , rB)
=+ C(z | xA, rA) + C(z | xB , rB) + I(xA : xB)±O(log(n/ǫ))
(9)
(the first inequality in (9) is always true, while the last equality is true with probability 1 − O(ǫ).) In case when z is
a computable function of (xA, rA) and a computable function of (xB , rB), we obtain from (9) that with probability
1−O(ǫ)
C(z) ≤ I(xA : xB) +O(log(n/ǫ)), (10)
and we are done.
The general case: randomized protocols with O(1)-round communication. Let us move now to the case when the
number of communication rounds is k > 0. As announced, we claim that the upper bound remains true: C(z | t) ≤
I(xA : xB) +O(log(n/ǫ)). The proof for the “light” case in which k is constant proceeds as follows.
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Inequality (7) has a relativized version,
C(z | t) ≤+ C(z | xA, rA, t) + C(z | xB , rB, t) + I(xA, rA : xB , rB | t), (11)
which is true for all xA, xB, rA, rB , z, t. When z is a computable function of (xA, rA, t) and a computable function
of (xB , rB, t), we obtain
C(z | t) ≤+ I(xA, rA : xB , rB | t). (12)
Thus, to prove our claim, it remains to show that for the transcript t
I(xA, rA : xB, rB | t) ≤
+ I(xA, rA : xB , rB). (13)
and then to use inequality (8).
Notice that, in general, the conditional mutual information I(a : b | c) can be much larger than the plain mutual
information I(a : b) (e.g., if a and b are independent strings of length n and c is the bitwise XOR of a and c, then
I(a : b | c) =+ n ≫ I(a : b) =+ 0). So, we should explain why (13) is true for these specific strings. The required
inequality can be deduced from the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. (a) Let f be a computable function of one argument. Then for all a, b
I(a : b | f(a)) ≤+ I(a : b). (14)
(b) Further, let g be a computable function of two arguments. Then for all a, b, c
I(a : b | g(a, c), c) ≤+ I(a : b | c). (15)
Proof. Inequality (14) follows directly from the chain rule:
I(a : b) =+ I(a, f(a) : b) (since f(a) can be computed from a)
=+ I(f(a) : b) + I(a : b | f(a)) (the chain rule)
≥+ I(a : b | f(a)) (non-negativity of the mutual information)
The proof of (15) is similar, we should only substitute c as a condition to each term I(∗) in the inference above. The
lemma is proven.
Now we proceed with a proof of (13). Recall from the definition of a protocol, that t = (x1, y1, . . . , xk, yk)
and each xi (respectively yi) is deterministically computed from xA, rA (respectively from xB , rB) and the previous
messages. We claim that
I(xA, rA : xB , rB) ≥+ I(xA, rA : xB, rB | x1)
≥+ I(xA, rA : xB, rB | x1, y1)
≥+ I(xA, rA : xB, rB | x1, y1, x2)
...
≥+ I(xA, rA : xB, rB | x1, y1, x2, y2, . . . , xk, yk).
(16)
The first line is a special case of (14) since x1 can be computed from (xA, rA). Every next line is a special case of
(15). Indeed, on each step we add to the condition of the term I(xA, rA : xB, rB | ∗) another string xi or yi, and every
time the newly added string is a function of (xA, rA) and the pre-history of the communication or of (xB , rB) and the
pre-history.
All the inequalities used in the argument are valid up to an additive term O(logC(xA, rA, xB, rB)), which is at
most O(log n) because rA and rB have length bounded by a polynomial in n. Since the number of rounds k (and
therefore the chain of inequalities (16)) is constant, the claimed upper bound is proved.
To prove the same inequality for a non-constant k and an arbitrary number of random bits, we will need a different
technique. We discuss it in Section 4.
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4 Main results
We prove here our main results. We present a secret key agreement protocol which produces a shared secret key of
length equal (up to logarithmic precision) to the mutual information of the inputs, provided the two parties know the
complexity profile. Next, we show that no protocol can produce a longer shared secret key. The formal statements are
as follows.
Theorem 4.1 (Lower bound). There exists a secret key agreement protocol with the following property: For every
n-bit strings x and y, for every constant ǫ > 0, if Alice’s input xA consists of x, the complexity profile of (x, y) and ǫ,
and Bob’s input xB consists of y, the complexity profile of (x, y) and ǫ, then, with probability 1− ǫ, the shared secret
key is a string z such that, C(z | t) ≥ |z| −O(log(1/ǫ)) and |z| ≥ I(x : y)− O(log(n/ǫ)), where t is the transcript
of the protocol.
Moreover, the communication consists of a single message sent by Alice to Bob of length C(x | y)+O(log(n/ǫ)),
Alice uses O(log(n/ǫ)) random bits, and Bob does not use any random bits.
Theorem 4.2 (Upper bound). Let us consider a protocol for secret key agreement, let xA and xB be input strings of
length n on which the protocol succeeds with error probability ǫ and randomness deficiency δ(n), and let z be the
random string that is the shared secret key output by the protocol, i.e., a string satisfying relations (2) and (3). Then
with probability at least 1 − O(ǫ), if n is sufficiently large, |z| ≤ I(xA : xB) + δ(n) + O(log(n/ǫ)), where the
constants in the O(·) notation depend on the universal machine and the protocol, but not on xA and xB .
Theorem 4.2 establishes the upper bound claimed in the Introduction. Indeed, for any pair of n-bit strings (x, y),
suppose that Alice’s input xA consists of x and the complexity profile of (x, y) and Bob’s input xB consists of y and
the complexity profile of (x, y). Note that I(xA : xB) =
+ I(x : y) because the length of the complexity profile
is bounded by O(log n). Hence, Theorem 4.2 implies that secret key agreement protocols in which the two parties,
besides x and respectively y, are additionally given the complexity profile of their inputs, can not produce a secret key
that is longer than I(x : y) +O(log n) (provided the randomness deficiency of the key satisfies δ(n) = O(log n)).
Remark 4. In Theorem 4.1 we construct a uniform communication protocol (see Remark 2 on p. 8), i.e., our protocol
is described by one program that deals with all x and y (the complexity profile of x and y is provided as an auxiliary
input). Theorem 4.2 is also stated for uniform protocols. In the uniform case we can ignore whether the adversary
knows the protocol (this knowledge affects all quantities of Kolmogorov complexity by at most an O(1) term).
Our negative result (Theorem 4.2) can be extended to non-uniform protocols. In the non-uniform setting the
statement of Theorem 4.2 has to be adjusted: we should assume that the protocol is “known” to the adversary, and all
complexity terms are “relativized” with respect to the protocol. Technically this means that we append the description
of the protocol to the condition of all complexity quantities involved in the theorem and in the value of C(z | t) in the
definition of the randomness deficiency.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We first give an overview of the protocol (an adaptation of the scheme “in a nutshell” explained
on p. 9).
In Step 1, Alice computes px|y a program for x given y of length C(x | y) + O(log n). She sends to Bob the
string px|y and also random strings r and s that both Alice and Bob will use in Step 2. The strings r and s have length
O(log(n/ǫ)).
In Step 2, Bob uses px|y and his string y, to construct x. Next, both Alice and Bob construct a O(log n)-short
program z˜ for x given px|y using the random string r. Then, using s, they modify z˜ and obtain the common output z
of the protocol.
Let us now see the details.
Step 1. Alice, using the complexity profile of x and y, first computes k = C(x, y) − C(x) + 4 logn. Taking into
account relation (1), if n is sufficiently large, C(x | y) + 8 logn ≥ k ≥ C(x | y). Next, using the algorithm from
Theorem 2.2, Alice on input (x, k, ǫ) computes a string px|y that, with probability 1− ǫ, is a program for x given y of
length k +O(log(n/ǫ)) ≤ C(x | y) +O(log(n/ǫ)). In what follows, we assume that px|y has this property (thus, we
exclude an event that has probability at most ǫ).
Note that C(px|y) ≥ C(x | y) (because px|y is a program for x given y), and C(px|y) ≤ |px|y| + O(1) ≤
k +O(log(n/ǫ)) ≤ C(x | y) +O(log(n/ǫ)). Thus, C(px|y) =
+ C(x | y).
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Next,
C(x | px|y) =
+ C(x, px|y)− C(px|y) (chain rule)
=+ C(x) − C(x | y) (px|y is computed from x and O(log(n/ǫ)) randomness)
=+ I(x : y).
(17)
Alice sends to Bob the string px|y and also random strings r and s of lengthO(log(n/ǫ)) that will be used by both
parties in Step 2.
Step 2. First, Bob reconstructs x from y and px|y.
Next, both Alice and, separately, Bob do the following. In the first phase, they use the random string r (from Step
1) and compute a string z˜, which almost has the desired properties, except that its randomness deficiency is a little
too large. In a second phase, they use the random string s (also from Step 1), to finally obtain z with all the desired
properties.
Phase 1. Using the complexity profile of x and y and based on relation (17), Alice and Bob compute k′ =
I(x : y) + c′ log(n/ǫ), for a constant c′ such that C(x|px|y) ≤ k
′. Then, using the algorithm from Theorem 2.2
on input (x, k′, ǫ), with randomness given by the random string r from Step 1, they compute a string z˜ of length
k′ + O(log(n/ǫ)). With probability (over r) at least 1 − O(ǫ), z˜ is a program for x given px|y. In what follows, we
assume that z˜ has this property (thus, we exclude another event that has probability at most O(ǫ)).
Note that |z˜| = k′ +O(log n) =+ I(x : y) and C(z˜) ≤ |z˜|+O(1) ≤+ I(x : y). Also
C(z˜ | px|y) ≥
+ C(x | px|y) (because z˜ is a program for x given px|y)
=+ I(x : y). (by using inequality (17))
Combining the last three relations, it follows that
|z˜| =+ C(z˜) =+ C(z˜ | px|y) =
+ I(x : y).
The transcript of the protocol (without s which has not been used yet) is t = (px|y, r), and since |r| = O(log(n/ǫ)),
we get
C(z˜ | t) ≥ I(x : y)−O(log(n/ǫ)) and |z˜| = I(x : y)−O(log(n/ǫ)). (18)
Thus, we are almost done, except for the fact that the randomness deficiency of z˜ is O(log(n/ǫ)), which is slightly too
large.
Phase 2. To reduce the randomness deficiency, we need to use a strong extractor. In what follows we use the
standard definitions of extractors that can be found, e.g., in [Sha02]. Recall that a function E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}m is a (k, ǫ) extractor if for any set B ⊆ {0, 1}n of size |B| ≥ 2k, and for any A ⊆ {0, 1}m,
Prob(E(UB , U{0,1}d) ∈ A) ∈
( |A|
M
− ǫ,
|A|
M
+ ǫ
)
,
where UB, U{0,1}d denote independent random variables uniformly distributed on B, and respectively {0, 1}
d, and
M = 2m.
A function E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k, ǫ) strong extractor if the function E1 defined by E1(x, y) =
(y, E(x, y)) is a (k, ǫ) extractor. Using the probabilistic method, one can show that there exist strong extractors with
m = k − 2 log(1/ǫ)−O(1) and d = logn+ 2 log(1/ǫ) +O(1) [Vad12, Theorem 6.17]. Alice and Bob compute by
brute-force such a strong extractor E.
For some value of k = I(x : y)− O(log(n/ǫ)) (the exact value of k is specified in the proof of the next lemma),
Alice and Bob use the strong (k, ǫ) extractor E : {0, 1}|z˜| × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m (with d and m as above), and the
random string s from Step 1, and take z = E(z˜, s). Intuitively, by the properties of a strong extractor, the output z is
random even conditioned by the seed s, which is exactly what we need here. The following lemma, whose proof is
given in Section 7.1, shows that indeed z has the desired properties.
Lemma 4.3. Let E be the above strong extractor, and suppose z˜ satisfies inequalities (18). If s is chosen uniformly
at random in {0, 1}d, and z = E(z˜, s), then with probability 1 − O(ǫ), C(z | t, s) ≥ |z| − O(log(1/ǫ)) and
|z| = I(x : y)−O(log(n/ǫ)).
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This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Remark 5. The proof of Theorem 4.1 can be adapted to the situation where Alice and Bob are not given the exact
value of the complexity profile of (x, y) but only an approximation of this profile. Indeed, assume that Alice and Bob
are given upper and lower bounds for each component of the complexity profile of (x, y) with precision≤ σ, for some
integer σ. Then we can use the communication protocol from the proof of Theorem 4.1 where the length of px|y is
chosen in accordance with the upper bound on C(x | y), and the length of the resulting key z is chosen in accordance
with the lower bound on the value of I(x : y). As a result, with probability 1 − O(ǫ), Alice and Bob agree on a
common secret z that is incompressible (i.e., C(z | t) ≥ |z| − O(log(1/ǫ)) where t is the transcript of the protocol),
and the length of z is greater than I(x : y)− σ −O(log(n/ǫ)).
Remark 6. In the protocol in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we use “digital fingerprints” of x computed by a combination
of randomness extractors and universal hashes (a part of the construction of these fingerprints is hidden in the proof of
Theorem 2.2). We apply “digital fingerprints” in two significantly different contexts: in Step 1, we use a fingerprint
of x to identify this string given the partial information on x held by Bob, and in Step 2, we use another fingerprint
to extract from x (almost) pure randomness, even conditional on the information on x held by the eavesdropper. In
the first case, we need to extract from x all the information about this string that Bob misses (with possibly a minor
overhead, which contains a part of information that Bob already knows). In the second case, we need to extract from
x the information that the eavesdropper misses after observing Step 1 (possibly with a minor shortage, so that the
randomness contained in x remains partially unrevealed). Both ideas have been used in other secret key agreement
protocols. However, their technical implementation in the AIT framework requires specific constructions needed for
this setting, such as, to give just one example, prefix extractors, which were first introduced explicitly in [RRV02], and
in AIT in [MRS11].
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Similarly to the argument in the light upper bound of the previous section, we are going to
combine inequalities (12) and (13). All we need to do is to establish inequality (13) for the case when the number of
rounds k is non-constant. The challenge is that we cannot iterate k applications of Lemma 3.1. If k is not a constant,
then the sum of k copies of O(log n) terms in (16) becomes too large. Thus, we need to handle the transcript t “in one
piece,” without splitting it in k messages. To this end we have to use instead of Lemma 3.1 some other tool.
We start with a reminder of the notion of a combinatorial rectangle (quite standard in communication complexity).
Definition 4.4. A set S ⊂ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ is a combinatorial rectangle, if it can be represented as a Cartesian
product S = A×B for some A,B ⊂ {0, 1}∗.
For example, in Fig. 2 the black cells in the table form a combinatorial rectangle (the black cells occupy the
intersection of columns a1, a2, a3, a4 and rows b1, b2, b3). We use the notion of a combinatorial rectangle in the
a1 a2 a3 a4
b1
b2
b3
Figure 2: Combinatorial rectangles.
following (less conventional) definition.
14
Definition 4.5. We say that a computable function f : {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is transcript-like, if for every t, the
pre-image f−1(t) is a combinatorial rectangle.
For example, the cells in the table in Fig. 2 are colored in four different colors (solid black, solid grey, and two
types of hatching), and cells of each color form a combinatorial rectangle. Thus, the function that maps each cell to its
color is transcript-like.
By definition, for every transcript-like function f , if f(a, b′) = f(a′, b) = t for some a, a′, b, b′, then we have also
f(a, b) = t. Notice that for every deterministic communication protocol with two parties (Alice and Bob) the mapping
f : [input of Alice xA]× [input of Bob xB] 7→ [the transcript of the protocol]
is transcript-like. A similar statement holds for randomized protocols with private source of randomness, we should
only join the random bits given to Alice and Bob with their inputs : the mapping
f : 〈xA, rA〉 × 〈xB , rB〉 7→ [the transcript of the protocol]
is also transcript-like.
Now we formulate a generalization of Lemma 3.1 (a), which can work with the transcript of the protocol ‘in one
piece’.
Lemma 4.6. If f : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is transcript-like computable function, then for all a, b
I(a : b | f(a, b)) ≤+ I(a : b). (19)
Remark 7. If f depends only on a or only on b, then f is transcript-like. Thus, Lemma 3.1 (a) is a special case of
Lemma 4.6.
Proof. Let us fix a pair (a, b) and denote t := f(a, b). We say that a string a′ is an A-clone of a (conditional on t), if
(iA) there exists another string b
′ such that f(a′, b′) = t, and
(iiA) C(a
′) ≤ C(a).
Similarly, we say that b′ is a B-clone of b (conditional on t), if
(iB) there exists another tuple a
′ such that f(a′, b′) = t, and
(iiB) C(b
′) ≤ C(b).
Remark 8. The A- and B-clones are in some sense “similar” to a and b respectively. In what follows we show that the
definition of clones is not too restrictive: there exist many clones of a and b.
Denote the sets of A-clones and B-clones by ClonesA and ClonesB respectively. By definition we have a ∈
ClonesA and b ∈ ClonesB . Let us show that in fact there exist many other A- and B-clones.
Claim 4.7. If complexities of a and b are bounded by n, then |ClonesA| ≥ 2C(a|f(a,b))−O(logn) and |ClonesB| ≥
2C(b|f(a,b))−O(logn).
Proof of the claim: Notice that for every computable function f the property
a string a′ is a clone of some a of complexity k conditional on t
is a semi-decidable predicate of the triple 〈a′, t, k〉. Therefore, given t and the value of C(a), we can run the process
of enumeration of all A-clones of a. Thus, to identify some specific A-clone a′ of a given t, we need to know the
complexity of a and the index of appearance of this specific clone in the enumeration of all A-clones. Hence, C(a′ | t)
is not greater than log |ClonesA|+O(log n). In particular, this inequality is true for a itself. Similarly, C(b | t) is not
greater than log |ClonesB |+O(log n). Taking the exponent of both sides of these inequalities, we obtain the Claim.
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Let us take a pair of “typical” clones (a′, b′) ∈ ClonesA ×ClonesB that maximizes C(a′, b′ | t). Due to the claim
above, this maximum is
C(a′, b′ | t) =+ log |ClonesA × ClonesB|
≥+ C(a | t) + C(b | t).
Thus, we have
C(a′, b′, t) =+ C(t) + C(a′, b′ | t) ≥+ C(t) + C(a | t) + C(b | t). (20)
By definition of clones, a′ and b′ belong to the projection of the pre-image f−1(t). Since f is a transcript-like
function, it follows that f(a′, b′) = t. That is, given a′ and b′ we can compute t, so C(t | a′, b′) =+ 0. Hence, the
left-hand side of (20) can be upper bounded as
C(a′, b′, t) ≤+ C(a′) + C(b′) ≤+ C(a) + C(b) (21)
(in the last inequality we used again the definition of clones). Combining (20) and (21) we obtain
C(t) + C(a | t) + C(b | t) ≤+ C(a) + C(b). (22)
Given C(t | a, b) =+ 0, inequality (22) rewrites to I(a : b | t) ≤+ I(a : b), and lemma is proven.
Now we are ready to prove the theorem. Denote by π the function
π : 〈x′A, r
′
A〉 × 〈x
′
B , r
′
B〉 7→ [the transcript of the protocol]
mapping the input data of Alice and Bob to the corresponding transcript of the communication protocol. Clearly, π is
a transcript-like function (as the outcome of any communication protocol). By applying Lemma 4.6 to the function π
we get inequality (13). This concludes to proof of the theorem.
Remark 9. The proof of inequality (13) applies even to “invalid” input data xA and xB , when Alice and Bob are given
false information on the complexity profile of the main input components x and y. (See Remark 1).
Remark 10. In some sense the proof of the weaker ‘light upper bound’ in section Section 3 is more robust than the
proof of Theorem 4.2, since it applies to protocols with small advice obtained from a trustable all-powerful helper, see
Section 8.5.
5 Secret key agreement for 3 or more parties
We analyze secret key agreement for 3 or more parties. All the results in this section are valid for any constant number
ℓ ≥ 3 of parties. For notational convenience, we handle the case of ℓ = 3 parties, but the proofs with straightforward
adaptations are valid for any constant ℓ.
Thus, this time there are three parties, which we call Alice, Bob, and Charlie. Alice has a string xA, Bob has a
string xB , and Charlie has a string xC . They also have private random bits rA, respectively rB and rC . They run a
k-round protocol. In each of the k rounds, each party broadcasts a message to the other two parties, where the message
is a string computed from the party’s input string and private random bits, and the messages from the previous rounds.
After the completion of the k rounds, each party computes a string. The requirement is that with probability at least
1− ǫ, they compute the same string, and that this string is random conditioned by the transcript of the protocol.
Formally, a k-round 3-party protocol for secret key agreement uses three computable functions A,B,C, and runs
as follows. The first party has as input an n-bit string xA and uses private randomness rA, the second party has as
input an n-bit string xB and uses private randomness rB , and the third party has as input an n-bit string xC and uses
private randomness rC . The protocol consists of the following calculations:
t1 = A(xA, rA), t2 = B(xB , rB), t3 = C(xC , rC),
t4 = A(xA, rA, t[1 : 3]), t5 = B(xB , rB , t[1 : 3]), t6 = C(xC , rC , t[1 : 3]),
...
t3k−2 = A(xA, rA, t[1 : 3(k − 1)]), t3k−1 = B(xB , rB, t[1 : 3(k − 1)]), t3k = C(xC , rC , t[1 : 3(k − 1)])
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Each row corresponds to one round and shows the messages that are broadcast in that round, and we use the notation
t[i : j] to denote the tuple of messages (ti, . . . , tj). We also denote t = t[1 : 3k], the entire transcript of the protocol.
The protocol succeeds with probability error ǫ and randomness deficiency δ(n) on the 3-tuple input (xA, xB, xC) if
with probability (1− ǫ) over rA, rB, rC ,
A(xA, rA, t) = B(xB , rB , t) = C(xC , rC , t)
def.
= z, (23)
and
C(z | t) ≥ |z| − δ(n). (24)
5.1 Omniscience: definitions and explicit expressions
We transfer to AIT the notion of omniscience introduced in IT (see the discussion in Section 1.1):
Definition 5.1. (1) For each triple of strings (x1, x2, x3), we denote by S(x1, x2, x3) the set of all triples of integers
(n1, n2, n3) that satisfy the following inequalities:
n1 ≥ C(x1 | x2, x3), n2 ≥ C(x2 | x1, x3), n3 ≥ C(x3 | x1, x2),
n1 + n2 ≥ C(x1, x2 | x3), n1 + n3 ≥ C(x1, x3 | x2), n2 + n3 ≥ C(x2, x3 | x1).
(25)
The constraints defining S(x1, x2, x3) will be referred to as the Slepian-Wolf constraints.
(2) We define CO(x1, x2, x3) to be the minimal value of n1 + n2 + n3 subject to n1, n2, n3 satisfying the Slepian-
Wolf constraints. (CO stands for communication for omniscience.)
This definition has a straightforward (though rather cumbersome) generalization for the tuples of size ℓ > 3:
Definition 5.2. (1) For each tuple of strings (x1, x2, . . . , xℓ), we denote by S(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) the set of all tuples
of integers (n1, n2, . . . , nℓ) that satisfy the following inequalities: for every splitting of the set of all indices into
two disjoint nonempty sets, {1, . . . , ℓ} = I ∪ J , we have
∑
i∈I
ni ≥ C(xI | xJ ). (26)
Similar to the case of ℓ = 3, the constraints defining S(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) are referred to as the Slepian-Wolf
constraints.
(2) We define CO(x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) to be the minimal value of n1 + · · · + nℓ subject to n1, . . . , nℓ satisfying the
Slepian-Wolf constraints.
The value of CO(x1, x2, x3) can be viewed as the solution of a problem of linear programming defined by con-
straints (25). This solution can be computed explicitly, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.3 (see Example 3 in [CN04]). The value of CO(x1, x2, x3) is equal to the maximum of the following
four quantities
C(x1 | x2, x3) + C(x2, x3 | x1),
C(x2 | x1, x3) + C(x1, x3 | x2),
C(x3 | x1, x2) + C(x1, x2 | x3),
1
2 [C(x1, x2 | x3) + C(x1, x3 | x2) + C(x2, x3 | x1)] .
Accordingly, the difference C(x1, x2, x3)− CO(x1, x2, x3) is equal to the minimum of the following four quantities:
I(x1 : x2, x3),
I(x2 : x1, x3),
I(x3 : x1, x2),
1
2 [C(x1) + C(x2) + C(x3)− C(x1, x2, x3)] .
(27)
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This result can be extended to the case ℓ > 3 as follows.
Proposition 5.4 ([CABE+15]). For every tuples of strings (x1, . . . , xℓ) the differenceC(x1, . . . , xℓ)−CO(x1, . . . , xℓ)
is equal to the minimum of the quantities
1
s−1 [C(xJ1 ) + . . .+ C(xJs)− C(x1, . . . , xℓ)] . (28)
over all splittings {1, . . . , ℓ} = J1 ∪ J2 ∪ . . . ∪ Js, where J1, . . . ,Js are nonempty and disjoint.
Remark 11. It is easy to see that the minimum of four values (27) is a special case of the minimum of (28) (for ℓ = 3).
In what follows, we show that there exists a protocol that on every input tuple (xA, xB, xC) produces with high
probability a secret key of length C(xA, xB, xC)− CO(xA, xB, xC)−O(log n) (provided the parties have the com-
plexity profile of the input tuple), and that no protocol can produce a secret key of length larger than C(xA, xB , xC)−
CO(xA, xB , xC) +O(log n). We prove the upper bound in Section 5.2 and the lower bound in Section 5.3.
5.2 Negative result for multi-party protocols
In this section we prove the upper bound on the length of the longest secret key that Alice, Bob, and Charlie can
agree upon. A weak version of this bound (for the protocols with O(1) rounds) can be obtained with the technique of
classic information inequalities, very similar to the proof of an analogous statement in [CN04] in the setting of IT. We
only need to “translate” the information inequalities for Shannon’s entropy from the proof in [CN04] in homologous
inequalities for Kolmogorov complexity, see Section 8.6. However, this technique does not work for protocols with
non-constant number of rounds. So, to prove our next theorem we use a quite different method, employing the method
of “clones” and constraint (non classic) information inequalities. This argument generalizes the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 5.5. Let us consider a 3-party protocol for secret key agreement with error probability ǫ. Let (xA, xB , xC)
be a 3-tuple of n-bit strings on which the protocol succeeds. Let z be the random variable which represents the
secret key computed from the input (xA, xB, xC) and let t be the transcript of the protocol that produces z. Then, for
sufficiently large n, with probability 1−O(ǫ),
C(z | t) ≤ C(xA, xB, xC)− CO(xA, xB, xC) +O(log(n/ǫ)),
where the constants in the O(·) notation depend on the universal machine and the protocol, but not on (xA, xB, xC).
Proof. Assume that Alice, Bob, and Charlie agreed on a common key z. Denote by t the transcript of the communi-
cation protocol. We need to show that C(z | t) is not greater than the minimum of four quantities (27).
Trivial case: no communication nor randomness. Similarly to the light upper bound in Section 3, we start with a
naive question: on which z, can Alice, Bob, and Charlie agree without any communication? The upper bound from
Section 3 applies to the case of three participants. Indeed, inequality (7) specializes to
C(z) ≤+ C(z | xA, xB) + C(z | xC) + I(xA, xB : xC).
Hence, if z can be computed by Alice, Bob, and Charlie given each of the strings xA, xB, xC , then
C(z) ≤+ I(xA, xB : xC). (29)
Similarly, we have
C(z) ≤+ I(xA, xC : xB) (30)
and
C(z) ≤+ I(xB , xC : xA). (31)
In addition to the three mutual information quantities handled above, the maximum in (27) involves another quantity,
which is specific for protocols with three participants. We treat it separately:
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Lemma 5.6. If z can be computed from each of the strings xA, xB, xC , then
C(z) ≤+
1
2
(C(xA) + C(xB) + C(xC)− C(xA, xB , xC)) . (32)
(See the proof in Section 7.)
The combination of (29), (30), (31), (32) implies that if a string z can be “extracted” from xA, xB , and xC (without
communication), then its complexity C(z) is not greater than (27).
Randomized protocol without communication. We join xA, xB , and xC with strings of random bits rA, rB , rC ,
and repeat the same arguments for the “common information” z, which is extracted from the triple 〈xA, rA〉, 〈xB, rB〉,
and 〈xC , rC〉. We obtain that C(z) is not greater than the minimum of
I(xA, rA : xB , rB, xC , rC),
I(xB , rB : xA, rA, xC , rA),
I(xC , rC : xA, rA, xB, rB),
1
2 [C(xA, rA) + C(xB , rB) + C(xC , rC)− C(xA, rA, xB, rB , xC , rC)] .
(33)
Then we notice that for randomly chosen rA, rB , and rC , with probability 1− ǫ the difference between (33) and (27)
is only O(log n/ǫ).
The general case: protocols with any number of rounds. The argument from the case of zero communication
examined above easily relativizes: if Alice, Bob, and Charlie agree (after some communication) on a common key z,
and the transcript of the communication is t, then C(z | t) is not greater than the minimum of
I(xA, rA : xB, rB , xC , rC | t),
I(xB , rB : xA, rA, xC , rC | t),
I(xC , rC : xA, rA, xB , rB | t),
1
2 [C(xA, rA | t) + C(xB , rB | t) + C(xC , rC | t)− C(xA, rA, xB, rB , xC , rC | t)] .
(34)
Let us prove that (34) is not greater than (33).
From the proof of Theorem 4.2 we know that the mutual information between parties’ data cannot increase when
we relativize it with the transcript t. Thus, the first three quantities in (33) cannot become greater when we add to
these terms the transcript t as a condition.
It remains to prove a similar inequality between the information quantity
J(xA, xB , xC) :=
1
2
[C(xA) + C(xB) + C(xC)− C(xA, xB, xC)]
and its relativized version
J(xA, xB, xC | t) :=
1
2
[C(xA | t) + C(xB | t) + C(xC | t)− C(xA, xB, xC | t)] .
Notice that, in general (for an arbitrary t), the inequality J(xA, xB, xC | t) ≤+ J(xA, xB, xC) can be false. So
we need to employ the fact that t is the transcript of a communication protocol. Here we reuse the technique from
Theorem 4.2. We adapt the notion of a transcript-like function to the protocols with three parties.
Definition 5.7. A set S ⊂ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ is a combinatorial parallelepiped, if it can be represented as a
Cartesian product S = A×B × C for some A,B,C ⊂ {0, 1}∗.
Definition 5.8. We say that a computable function f : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is transcript-like, if for
every t, the pre-image f−1(t) is a combinatorial parallelepiped.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.2, we will use the trick with “clones” of inputs. Let f be any transcript-like
function of three arguments. We fix a triple of strings (a, b, c) (of length at most n) and denote t := f(a, b, c). We say
that a string a′ is an A-clone of a (conditional on t), if
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(i) there exist some strings b′, c′ such that f(a′, b′, c′) = t, and
(ii) C(a′) ≤ C(a).
Denote the sets of A-clones byClonesA. Similarly, we define the set of B-clones of b (denotedClonesB) and C-clones
of c (denoted ClonesC ), conditional on the fixed value t = f(a, b, c).
Claim 5.9. Assuming that complexities of the strings a, b, and c are bounded by an integer n, we get |ClonesA| ≥
2C(a|f(a,b,c))−O(logn), |ClonesB| ≥ 2C(b|f(a,b,c))−O(logn), and |ClonesC | ≥ 2C(c|f(a,b,c))−O(logn).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Claim 4.7.
Lemma 5.10. If f : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is transcript-like function, then for all a, b, c we have
J(a, b, c | f(a, b, c)) ≤ J(a, b, c).
Proof. Fix a, b, c and denote t := f(a, b, c). We choose a triple
(a′, b′, c′) ∈ ClonesA × ClonesB × ClonesC
that maximizes C(a′, b′, c′ | t). Due to the Claim above we have
C(a′, b′, c′, t) =+ C(t) + log |ClonesA × ClonesB × ClonesC |
≥+ C(t) + C(a | t) + C(b | t) + C(c | t).
On the other hand, t can be deterministically computed as f(a′, b′, c′), so
C(a′, b′, c′, t) ≤+ C(a′) + C(b′) + C(c′) ≤+ C(a) + C(b) + C(c).
Combining the last two inequalities we obtain
C(t) + C(a | t) + C(b | t) + C(c | t) ≤+ C(a) + C(b) + C(c),
which rewrites (assuming C(t | a, b, c) =+ 0) to
C(a | t) + C(b | t) + C(c | t)− C(a, b, c | t) ≤+ C(a) + C(b) + C(c)− C(a, b, c).
Hence, J(a, b, c | t) ≤ J(a, b, c), and the lemma is proven.
Now we conclude the proof of the theorem. Denote by π the function
π : 〈x′A, r
′
A〉 × 〈x
′
B , r
′
B〉 × 〈x
′
C , r
′
C〉 7→ [the transcript of the protocol]
mapping the input data of Alice, Bob, and Charlie to the transcript of the communication protocol. This is a transcript-
like function (as the outcome of any communication protocol with three parties in the model input in the hand). So
we can apply Lemma 5.10 to this mapping π, and we are done.
Remark 12. The inequality J(a, b, c | t) ≤+ J(a, b, c) can be easily proven in case when t is a deterministic function
of one of the arguments a, b or c. This observation (plus the idea to split the transcript t into separate messages)
essentially gives the proof of Theorem 8.2 (for a constant number of rounds).
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The case of ℓ > 3 parties. Let us sketch the proof of a general version of Theorem 5.5 for any constant number of
parties ℓ ≥ 3. To this end we should generalize the information quantities J(a, b, c), J(a, b, c | t) defined above. We
need to consider the s-valent version of J for all s = 2, . . . , ℓ,
J(x1, x2, . . . , xs) :=
1
s− 1
[
C(x1) + . . .+ C(xs)− C(x1, . . . , xs)
]
and
J(x1, x2, . . . , xs | t) :=
1
s− 1
[
C(x1 | t) + . . .+ C(xs | t)− C(x1, . . . , xs | t)
]
.
(Observe that these quantities appear in (28).)
The notions of a transcript-like function can be extended to the functions with ℓ > 3 arguments. The tech-
nique of “clones” permits to generalize Lemma 5.10 to this case. It follows that for all transcript-like function
f = f(x1, x2, . . . , xs) it holds
J(x1, x2, . . . , xs | f(x1, x2, . . . , xs)) ≤ J(x1, x2, . . . , xs).
Combining this observation with Proposition 5.4 we obtain the generalization of Theorem 5.5 for any number of
parties ℓ > 3. We omit the details of this proof (which is a rather straightforward but cumbersome generalization of
the proof of Theorem 5.5).
Remark 13. Similarly to the case of two party protocols, the upper bounds for multi-party protocols can be extended
to the setting with non-uniform communication protocols (see Remarks 2, 4). The generalization of the proof is quite
straightforward, though the statement of the theorem becomes more technical (we have to append a description of the
protocol to the condition of all complexity terms involved in the theorem).
5.3 Positive results for multi-party protocols
In this section we prove the positive statement: we describe a 3-party protocol that on every input tuple (xA, xB , xC)
produces with high probability a secret key of length
C(xA, xB , xC)− CO(xA, xB , xC)−O(log n)
assuming that the parties are given the complexity profile of the input tuple.
Theorem 5.11. There exists a 3-party protocol for secret key agreement with the following characteristics:
(1) For every n, for every tuple (x1, x2, x3) of n-bit strings, for every ǫ > 0, if Alice’s input xA consists of x1, the
complexity profile of the tuple and ǫ, Bob’s input xB consists of x2, the complexity profile of the tuple and ǫ,
and Charlie’ input xC consists of x3, the complexity profile of the tuple and ǫ, then, at the end, the three parties
compute with probability 1−O(ǫ) a common string z such that
C(z | t) ≥ |z| −O(log(1/ǫ)) and |z| ≥ C(x1, x2, x3)− CO(x1, x2, x3)−O(log(n/ǫ)),
where t is the transcript of the protocol, and the constants in the O(·) notation depend only on the universal
machine.
(2) The protocol has 1 round and each party uses O(log(n/ǫ)) random bits.
Proof. We first give an overview of the protocol.
In the first step, the three parties compute an optimal tuple (n1, n2, n3) for the optimization problems that defines
CO(x1, x2, x3) (see Definition 5.1), and then Alice computes pA of length n1+O(logn), Bob computes pB of length
n2 + O(log n), and Charlie computes pC of length n3 + O(log n), such that with high probability (xA, pB, pC) is a
program for (x1, x2, x3), (pA, xB, pC) is a program for (x1, x2, x3), and (pA, pB, xC) is a program for (x1, x2, x3).
Next, Alice broadcasts pA, Bob broadcasts pB , and Charlie broadcasts pC . Alice also broadcasts a random string r of
length O(log n) bits, which will be used in the second step.
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In the second step, each party first computes (x1, x2, x3). Next, each party, using the randomness r, computes a
string z that with high probability is a short program for (x1, x2, x3) given (pA, pB, pC). We will show that z has the
desired properties.
We proceed with the details.
Step 1. Using the complexity profile of (x1, x2, x3), each party computes a common tuple (n1, n2, n3) which is
optimal for the optimization problem that defines CO(x1, x2, x3) (there may be more optimal tuples, but the parties
agree on choosing the same tuple in some canonical way).
Next, Alice uses the encoding procedure E from Theorem 2.1 for ℓ = 2, on input x1, n1, ǫ and obtains pA. The
length of pA is bounded by n1+O(log(n/ǫ)). Similarly, Bob and Charlie obtain pB and respectively pC , from x2, n2,
and respectively x3, n3. The parties broadcast pA, pB, pC as indicated in the overview.
Step 2. Alice uses the decoding algorithmD from Theorem 2.1 for ℓ = 2, on input x1, pB, pC . Since n2, n3 satisfy
the Slepian-Wolf constraints (i.e., n2 + n3 ≥ C(x2, x3 | x1), n2 ≥ C(x2 | x1, x3), n3 ≥ C(x3 | x1, x2)), it follows
that with probability 1 − O(ǫ), Alice can reconstruct x2 and x3, and since she has x1, she obtains (x1, x2, x3). The
similar facts hold for Bob and Charlie. Therefore, with probability 1−O(ǫ), each party obtains the tuple (x1, x2, x3),
an event which henceforth we assume to hold.
For the next operation, the plan is to use the encoding procedure given in Theorem 2.2 and compute a short
program for (x1, x2, x3) given (pA, pB, pC). For that, the parties need to have a tight upper bound for C(x1, x2, x3 |
pA, pB, pC). Such an upper bound is provided in the following claim, which will be proved later.
Claim 5.12. There exists a constant d such that
C(x1, x2, x3 | pA, pB, pC) ≤ C(x1, x2, x3)− CO(x1, x2, x3) + d logn.
Now, using the upper bound provided by Claim 5.12, Alice (and also Bob, Charlie) use the encoding procedure
from Theorem 2.2 and on input (x1, x2, x3), upper bound k = C(x1, x2, x3)−CO(x1, x2, x3)+ d logn and random-
ness r, computes a string z, of length |z| = k + c log(n/ǫ) for some constant c, that, with probability 1 − O(ǫ) is a
program for (x1, x2, x3) given (pA, pB, pC). The transcript of the protocol is t = (pA, pB, pC , r). We have
C(z | t) = C(z | pA, pB, pC , r) =+ C(z | pA, pB, pC) (because |r| = O(log n))
≥+ C(x1, x2, x3 | pA, pB, pC) (because z is a program for (x1, x2, x3) given pA, pB, pC)
=+ C(x1, x2, x3)− C(pA, pB, pC)
(because pA is computed from x1 and O(log n) bits, similarly for pB, pC)
≥+ C(x1, x2, x3)− (n1 + n2 + n3) ( |pA| ≤
+ n1, similarly for pB, pC )
= C(x1, x2, x3)− CO(x1, x2, x3)
≥+ |z|,
which shows that z is a secret key with randomness deficiency O(log(n/ǫ)). Using randomness extractors and an
additional random string s broadcast by Alice in Step 1, similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1, the randomness deficiency
of z can be reduced to O(log(1/ǫ)).
It remains to prove Claim 5.12.
Proof of Claim 5.12. Suppose that Alice, Bob, and Charlie know s = C(x1, x2, x3 | pA, pB, pC). Since each of x1, x2
and x3 are n-bits long, C(x1, x2, x3 | pA, pB, pC) ≤ 3n + O(1), and thus the length of s in binary representation
is bounded by logn + O(1) bits. Suppose s is given as part of the input, i.e., Alice’s input is (x1, s) instead of
just x1, and similarly s is given to Bob and Charlie. Then Alice, Bob and Charlie can use the encoding procedure
given in Theorem 2.2: From (x1, x2, x3), the upper bound s and the randomness r, they compute a string z
′ that,
with probability 1 − 1/n is a program for (x1, x2, x3) given (pA, pB, pC) and z′ has length |z′| ≤ s + c logn =
C(x1, x2, x3 | pA, pB, pC) + c logn for some constant c. We have
C(z′ | pA, pB, pC) ≥ C(x1, x2, x3 | pA, pB, pC)
(because z′ is a program for (x1, x2, x3) given (pA, pB, pC)
≥ |z′| − c logn.
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The transcript of the protocol (that uses s as part of the input) is t = (pA, pB, pC , r) and since the length of r is only
O(log n), it follows that C(z′ | t) =+ C(z′ | pA, pB, pC) and thereforeC(z′ | t) ≥+ |z′|. It follows that z′ is a secret
key that Alice, Bob, and Charlie have obtained via the protocol with s added to the input. It follows from Theorem 5.5
that we get the upper boundC(z′ | t) ≤ C(x1, x2, x3, s)−CO(x1, x2, x3)+ d′ logn, for some constant d′. Since s is
only logn+ O(1) bits long, we can drop s at the cost of increasing the constant d′. The conclusion follows, because
C(x1, x2, x3 | pA, pB, pC) ≤ C(z′ | pA, pB, pC) ≤ C(z′ | t).
(End of proof of Claim 5.12.)
6 Communication complexity of secret key agreement
It is of interest to find the communication complexity for the task of finding a shared secret key having the optimal
length of I(x : y). We solve this problem in the model of randomized protocols with public random bits, visible to
Alice, Bob, and the adversary. This model is obtained by modifying slightly the definition from Section 2.2 (in which
the random bits are private): we require that rA = rB = r and we change equation (3) to C(z | t, r) ≥ |z| − δ(n).
The protocol presented in the proof of Theorem 4.1 solves the task with communication min(C(x | y), C(y |
x)) + O(log n). As presented, that protocol uses private random bits, but it can be easily modified to work in the
model with public randomness. Indeed, Alice and Bob use only O(log n) private random bits. So, if we make these
bits known to the adversary, this will not affect much the secrecy of the common key z produced in the protocol. That
is, we still have the inequality
C(z | [everything known to the adversary]) ≥ |z| −O(log n),
only the constant in the term O(log n) becomes bigger (compared to equation (18)). Thus, the assumption that all
participants of the protocol have access to a public source of random bits, only makes the protocol simpler, and with
decreased communication complexity by O(log n).
We argue that within the model with public randomness the communication complexity of this protocol is optimal,
up to the O(log n) term. In what follows, we assume as usual that Alice is given a string x and Bob is given a string
y, and both parties know the complexity profile of (x, y).
Theorem 6.1. Let ǫ, δ1, δ2 be arbitrary positive real constants. There is no secret key agreement protocol with public
random bits such that for all inputs x and y,
1. the communication complexity of the protocol (the total number of all bits sent by Alice and Bob) is less than
(1− δ1)min{C(x | y), C(y | x)},
2. Alice and Bob agree with probability > ǫ on a common key z such that C(z | t, r) > δ2I(x : y), where r is the
public randomness and t = t(x, y, r) is the transcript of the protocol.
Specifying the parameters. To prove the theorem, we find a ‘hard’ pair (x, y), on which any communication
protocol with public randomness fails. More specifically, we will choose a ‘hard’ pair with the profile
C(x) =+ 2n, C(y) =+ 2n, C(x, y) =+ 3n (35)
(for large enough n); notice that (35) implies I(x : y) =+ n. We will show that if the protocol satisfies condition (1)
from Theorem 6.1, then, for the chosen ‘hard’ strings (x, y), condition (2) from this theorems is false.
Remark 14. The construction that we present in this section can be adapted to construct a ‘hard’ pair (x, y) with any
given nontrivial complexity profiles (we only need that C(x|y) and C(y|x) are both not too small). We could make
Theorem 6.1 stronger by replacing the constant values δi by δi = λi logn/n with large enough constant coefficients
λi > 0 (i = 1, 2). We sacrifice the generality to simplify the notation.
Digression: common information. Before we prove Theorem 6.1, we remind some results on common information.
We say (somewhat informally) that strings x and y share k bits of common information, if there exists a string w of
complexity k such that w can be easily “extracted” from x and from y, i.e., C(w | x) ≈ 0 and C(w | y) ≈ 0. To make
this statement formal, we must specify the precision of the equalities C(w | x) ≈ 0 and C(w | y) ≈ 0. In the next
definition we introduce a suitable notation.
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Definition 6.2. We say that k bits of common information can be extracted from x and y with inaccuracies (kA, kB),
if there exists a string w such that 

C(w) ≥ k,
C(w | x) ≤ kA,
C(w | y) ≤ kB.
Denote by ComInf(x, y) the set of all triples (k, kA, kB) such that k bits of common information can be extracted
from x and y with inaccuracies (kA, kB).
It is know that ComInf(x, y) is not uniquely defined by the complexity profile of (x, y). That is, pairs (x, y) and
(x′, y′)with very similar (or even identical) complexity profiles can have very different properties of “extractability” of
the mutual information, see [CMR+02]. The next theorem describes the minimal possible set of triples ComInf(x, y)
for a pair with complexity profile (35).
Theorem 6.3. [Muc98] For every δ > 0 and for all large enough n there exists a pair of strings (x, y) such that
C(x) =+ 2n, C(y) =+ 2n, C(x, y) =+ 3n, and no triple (k, kA, kB) satisfying


kA ≤ (1 − δ)n,
kB ≤ (1 − δ)n,
kA + kB + δn ≤ k
belongs to ComInf(x, y).
I. Razenshteyn proposed a more constructive version of Theorem 6.3. Though we cannot algorithmically construct
a pair (x, y) satisfying Theorem 6.3 (there is obviously no short algorithmic description of any object of high Kol-
mogorov complexity), we can immerse such a pair in a large constructive set where the majority of elements have the
desired property:
Theorem 6.4. [Raz11] For every δ > 0 there exists an algorithm that for all large enough n generates some list
of pairs Sn such that for the majority of (x, y) ∈ Sn C(x) =+ 2n, C(y) =+ 2n, C(x, y) =+ 3n, and no triple
(k, kA, kB) satisfying 

kA ≤ (1 − δ)n,
kB ≤ (1 − δ)n,
kA + kB + δn ≤ k
belongs to ComInf(x, y).
Remark 15. Technically, [Raz11] formulates Theorem 6.4 only in the symmetric setting kA = kB . However Razen-
shteyn’s proof applies in the general case.
Remark 16. When we claim in Theorem 6.4 that an algorithm generates a set Sn, we mean that on the input n the
algorithm prints the list of elements of this set and stops. It is important that the enumeration of Sn has a distinguishable
completion.
The weak version of “constructiveness” that appear in Theorem 6.4 is called stochasticity, [She83]. An individual
string x is called (α, β)-stochastic, if there exists an algorithm of complexity < α that prints the list of elements of a
set S such that x ∈ S and C(x) ≥ log |S| − β. That is, if α and β are small, then an (α, β)-stochastic string x is, so
to say, a typical element in a simple set.
The notion of (α, β)-stochasticity can be easily adjusted to deal with pairs of strings. Thus, Theorem 6.4 asserts
that there exist (O(log n), O(log n))-stochastic pairs with the worst possible extractability of the mutual information.
On the uselessness of random oracles. In computability theory, it is very common to study “relativized” compu-
tations, i.e., computations with an oracle. In the theory of Kolmogorov complexity, a natural version of relativization
consists in adding an oracle (which can be a finite or infinite sequence of bits) to the “condition” part of all complexity
terms. So, the property of extracting of k bits of common information from x and y with an oracle r can be formulated
24
as follows: there exists a string w such that C(w | r) = k, while C(w | x, r) ≈ 0 and C(w | y, r) ≈ 0. More
generally, we define ComInf(x, y | r) as the set of all triples (k, kA, kB) such that


C(w | r) ≥ k,
C(w | x, r) ≤ kA,
C(w | y, r) ≤ kB.
If a string r is independent of (x, y), i.e., I(x, y : r) ≈ 0, then it seems natural to conjecture that all reasonable
properties of Kolmogorov complexity concerning (x, y) do not change if we relativize them with r. In particular, it
seems plausible that the difference between the sets ComInf(x, y|r) and ComInf(x, y) must be negligible. Surpris-
ingly, this conjecture remains unproven. However, a version of this conjecture for stochastic pairs is known to be
true.
Theorem 6.5. [MR10] If (x, y) is (O(log n), O(log n))-stochastic, then the set ComInf(x, y | r) belongs to an
O(log n)-neighborhood of ComInf(x, y) and vice-versa.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 6.1.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. We fix some ǫ, δ1, δ2 > 0. Assume for the sake of the argument that in a protocol with commu-
nication complexity< (1−δ1)n, Alice and Bob agree with a probability greater than ǫ on a common secret key z such
that C(z | t, r) > δ2n. We show that this assumption leads to a contradiction. We will provide a counterexample, i.e.,
a pair (x, y) on which the protocol fails. First, we consider a degenerate case — a communication protocol without
randomness.
(a) The case of deterministic protocols. At first, we focus on a very special case: we assume that the communication
protocol is deterministic (Alice and Bob do not use the source of random bits). In this caseC(z | t, r) > δ2n simplifies
to C(z | t) > δ2n.
Denote w := 〈t, z〉. We look at this w as sort of “common information” extracted from x and y. Let us estimate
the parameters of this “shared part” of two strings.
• [a trivial calculation] C(w | x) ≤+ C(t) + C(z | t, x) ≤+ (1− δ1)n,
• [a similar calculation] C(w | y) ≤+ C(t) + C(z | t, y) ≤+ (1− δ1)n,
• [a less trivial but also straightforward calculation]
C(w) =+ C(w | x) + C(w | y) + I(x : y)− I(x : y | w) [Section 7, Lemma 7.9(a)]
=+ C(w | x) + C(w | y) + I(x : y)− I(x : y | t) + C(z | t) [Section 7, Lemma 7.9(b)]
≥+ C(w | x) + C(w | y) + C(z | t)
≥+ C(w | x) + C(w | y) + δ2n.
For the transition from the second to the third line we used the inequality I(x : y)− I(x : y | t) ≥+ 0, which can be
false for arbitrary x, y, t. Fortunately, it is true if t is the transcript of a communication protocol with inputs x and y
(Lemma 4.6).
We know from Theorem 6.3 that the three inequalities above cannot hold together, if (x, y) is a pair with a minimal
ComInf(x, y). Thus, we get a contradiction.
(b) Randomized protocols. Now we want to extend the result from the previous paragraph to randomized protocol.
We assume now that there exists a communication protocol with public random bits r such that for most r the protocol
produces a transcript t of size< (1−δ1)n that permits to extract from x and y a common key z such thatC(z | t, r) ≥
δ2n.
Denote again w := 〈t, z〉. Then the triple (C(w | r), C(w | x, r), C(w | y, r)) belongs to ComInf(x, y | r). We
can repeat the calculations from Case (a), adding the string r to the condition of all complexities:
• C(w | x, r) ≤+ (1− δ1)n,
• C(w | y, r) ≤+ (1 − δ1)n,
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• C(w | r) ≥+ C(w | x, r) + C(w | y, r) + δ2n
We may assume that r is independent of (x, y), i.e., I(x, y : r) =+ 0. If (x, y) is a stochastic pair, then from
Theorem 6.5 it follows that an almost the same triple of integers
(C(w | r) ±O(log n), C(w | x, r) ±O(log n), C(w | y, r)±O(log n))
must belong to ComInf(x, y). Due to Theorem 6.4 this is false for some stochastic (x, y), and we get a contradiction.
7 Several technical lemmas
7.1 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Let us fix a z˜ and t that satisfy the relations (18). We introduce some notation:
n′ = |z˜|, t˜ = (t, n′, ǫ), α = C(z˜ | t˜).
By the relations (18) and the fact that n′ ≤ n, we have, for some constant c,
C(z˜ | t˜) ≥ |z˜| − c log(n/ǫ).
Let k = |z˜| − c log(n/ǫ). Thus, C(z˜ | t˜) ≥ k.
We useE : {0, 1}n
′
×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, a (k−c1, ǫ)- strong extractor (for some constant c1 that will be specified
later), havingm = k − c1 − 2 log(1/ǫ)−O(1) and d = logn′ + 2 log(1/ǫ) +O(1).
In the following lemmas, s is a seed of the above strong extractorE chosen uniformly at random and z = E(z˜, s).
Lemma 7.1. With probability 1−O(ǫ) over the choice of s,
C(z˜, s | t˜, α) ≤ C(z, s | t˜) + C(z˜ | t˜)−m+ log(1/ǫ) +O(1).
Lemma 7.2. With probability 1−O(ǫ) over the choice of s,
C(z˜, s | t˜, α) ≥ C(z˜ | t˜, α) + |s| −O(log(1/ǫ))−O(1).
Lemma 7.3. C(z˜ | t˜, α) ≥ C(z˜ | t˜)−O(1).
Lemma 7.4. For every s, C(z, s | t˜) ≤ |s|+ C(z | s, t˜) +O(1).
Combining the four lemmas, we obtain that, with probability 1 − O(ǫ), C(z | s, t˜) ≥ m− O(log(1/ǫ))− O(1).
Since |z| = m = I(x : y)−O(logn)−O(log(1/ǫ)) and taking into account that t˜ includes t, we obtainC(z | t, s) ≥
|z| −O(log(1/ǫ))−O(1), and that the length of z is I(x : y)−O(log n)−O(1/ǫ).
It remains to prove the lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 7.1. Recall that the function E1 : {0, 1}n
′
× {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d × {0, 1}m defined by E1(w, s) =
(s, E(w, s)) is a (k− c1, ǫ) extractor. We view E1 also as a bipartite graph, where the set of left nodes is {0, 1}n
′
, the
set of right nodes is {0, 1}d× {0, 1}m, and (w, (s, z)) is an edge if E(w, s) = z (or, equivalently,E1(w, s) = (s, z)).
Let
B = {w ∈ {0, 1}n
′
| C(w | t˜) ≤ C(z˜ | t˜}.
We say that a right node (s, z) in the above graph is heavy, if its B-degree is ≥ (1/ǫ) |B|M , where M = 2
m (the
B-degree of a node is the number of edges coming from B into the node). Let HEAVY be the set of nodes that are
heavy. By counting from the left and also from the right the edges that go out from B, we get
|HEAVY| · (1/ǫ) ·
|B|
M
≤ |B| · D,
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and therefore,
|HEAVY|
M ·D
≤ ǫ.
A left node w ∈ B is poor if for more than 2ǫ fraction of s ∈ {0, 1}d, E1(w, s) is heavy.
Claim 7.5. The number of poor nodes is less than 2k−c1 .
Proof. Let POOR be the set of poor nodes. Since
Prob(E1(UPOOR, U{0,1}d) ∈ HEAVY) > 2ǫ
≥ |HEAVY|M·D + ǫ,
the number of poor nodes has to be less than 2k−c1 because otherwise the extractor property of E1 would be contra-
dicted.
Claim 7.6. z˜ is not poor.
Proof. Suppose z˜ is poor. Then C(z˜ | t˜, α) ≤ k − c1, because, given t˜, α, the string tz is described by its index in
a canonical enumeration of B and the size of B is bounded by 2k−c1 (by Claim 7.5). It is known that for any z′, t′,
C(z′ | t′, C(z′ | t′)) ≥ C(z′ | t′) − O(1) (this is the relativized version of the known inequality C(z′ | C(z′)) ≥
C(z′)−O(1), see [SUV17, Exercise 44]). It follows that
C(z˜ | t˜) ≤ C(z˜ | t˜, α) +O(1) ≤ k − c1 +O(1). (36)
On the other hand, C(z˜ | t˜) ≥ k. If c1 is large enough, we get a contradiction.
Claim 7.6 says that for a fraction of 1 − 2ǫ of s ∈ {0, 1}d, the node (s, p) is non-heavy, where z = E(z˜, s). If
(s, z) is non-heavy, then the number of its left neighbors in B is bounded by
(1/ǫ)
|B|
M
≤ (1/ǫ)
2C(z˜|t˜)+1
M
= 2C(z˜|t˜)−m+log(1/ǫ)+1.
It follows that, given t˜, α, z˜ can be described by a non-heavy (s, z) and its index in an enumeration of the left nodes
of (s, z) in B. Thus, with probability 1− 2ǫ over the choice s,
C(z˜, s | t˜, α) ≤ C(z, s | t˜) + (C(z˜ | t˜)−m+ log(1/ǫ) + 1) +O(1).
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 7.2. Let w = C(z˜ | t˜, α) + |s| − C(z˜, s | t˜, α). Note that w is a random variable because it depends
on s. We need to show that w = O(log(1/ǫ)), with probability 1− ǫ.
By the standard counting argument, we have that with probability 1− ǫ,
C(s | t˜, α) ≥ |s| − log(1/ǫ). (37)
Let us fix an s that satisfies inequality (37). We show that the w that corresponds to this s satisfies w = O(log(1/ǫ)),
from which the conclusion follows.
If w ≤ 0, we are done. So let us suppose that w > 0.
Let u = C(z˜, s | t˜, α) = C(z˜ | t˜, α) + |s| − w = (α − O(1)) + |s| − w (the last equality holds because
C(z˜ | t˜, α) = C(z˜ | t˜)−O(1), by the first part of inequality (36)).
Let A = {(z′, s′) | C(z′, s′ | t˜, α) ≤ u}. Note that |A| ≤ 2u+1. For every z′, we define Az′ = {s′ | (z′, s′) ∈ A}.
Let e be the integer for which 2e−1 < |Az˜ | ≤ 2e. Since s ∈ Az˜ and Az˜ can be enumerated given w, t˜, α and O(1)
bits, it follows that
C(s | t˜, α) ≤ e+ 2 logw +O(1). (38)
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Let H = {z′ | |Az˜ | > 2e−1}. Note that |H | ≤ |A|/2e−1 ≤ 2u−e+2 and that z˜ is in H . We can write the index of z˜ in
an enumeration ofH on exactly u− e+ 2 bits and taking into account that u can be computed from z˜, α, w and O(1)
bits, it follows that e can be derived as well from the index of z˜ and the information mentioned above. In this way, we
have all the information needed to enumerateH and we obtain
C(z˜ | t˜, α) ≤ u− e+ 2 + 2 logw +O(1). (39)
Adding inequalities (38) and (39), we get
C(z˜ | t˜, α) + C(s | t˜, α) ≤ u+ 4 logw +O(1)
≤ (C(z˜ | t˜, α) + |s| − w) + 4 logw +O(1).
Taking into account inequality (37), we obtain w − 4 logw ≤ log(1/ǫ) + O(1), which implies w = O(log(1/ǫ)), as
desired.
Proof of Lemma 7.3. This is the first part in the chain of inequalities (36).
Proof of Lemma 7.4. This follows from the fact that given t˜ (which contains n′) we can find the length of s, and
therefore we do not need delimiters to concatenate s and a description of z given s and t˜.
7.2 Useful information inequalities
Lemma 7.7. Let f be a computable function, and suppose that for every string x, we choose a string r uniformly at
random among the strings of length f(|x|). Then,
(1) with probability 1− ǫ,
∣∣C(x, r) − (C(x) + C(r | x))∣∣ ≤ O(log(|x|/ǫ)),
(2) with probability 1− ǫ, ∣∣C(x, r) − (C(r) + C(x | r))∣∣ ≤ O(log(|x|/ǫ))
and
(3) with probability 1− ǫ,
C(x, r) = C(x) + |r| ±O(log(|x|/ǫ)).
Proof. Note that part (3) follows, after a rescaling of ǫ, from part (1) and the fact that with probability 1 − ǫ, C(r |
x) ≥ |r| − log(1/ǫ).
We prove (1). The proof of (2) is similar.
Clearly, C(x, r) ≤ C(x) + C(r | x) + 2 log |x| + O(1) by using the standard way of appending two strings in a
self-delimiting manner.
For the other inequality, we tweak the proof of the chain rule. We fix x and r and let t = C(x, r)− |r|+ log(1/ǫ).
By the standard counting argument, with probability 1 − ǫ, t is positive, which we assume from now on. Since
C(x, r) ≤ |x|+ |r|+2 log |x|+O(1) and C(x, r) = t+ |r|− log(1/ǫ), we get t ≤ |x|+2 log |x|+ log(1/ǫ)+O(1),
and from here log t ≤ O(log(|x|/ǫ)), a fact which we will use later.
Now, let A = {(x′, r′) | C(x′, r′) ≤ t + |r|}. For each x′, let Ax′ = {r
′ | (x′, r′) ∈ A}. Let e be such that
2e−1 < |Ax| ≤ 2e. Note that by taking into account that |r| = f(|x|),
C(r | x) ≤ e+ 2 log t+O(1). (40)
Next, let H = {x′ | Ax′ > 2
e−1}. We have |H | ≤ |A|/2e−1 ≤ 2t+|r|+1/2e−1 = 2t+|r|−e+2. Note that x can be
described by its rank in an enumeration ofH , and for the enumeration ofH we need t and e. By writing the rank of x
on exactly t+ |r| − e+ 2 bits, and keeping in mind that |r| can be computed from |x|, we obtain
C(x) ≤ t+ |r| − e+ 2 + 2 log t+ 2 log |x|+O(1). (41)
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By adding equations (40) and (41), we obtain C(x) + C(r | x) ≤ t+ |r|+ 4 log t+ 2 log |x|+O(1). Therefore,
C(x, r) = t+ |r| − log(1/ǫ)
≥ C(x) + C(r | x)− 4 log t− 2 log |x| − log(1/ǫ)−O(1)
≥ C(x) + C(r | x)−O(log(|x|/ǫ)).
Lemma 7.8. For all xA, xB , z, C(z) ≤
+ C(z | xA) + C(z | xB) + I(xA : xB).
Proof. For all xA, xB, z we have
C(xA, xB | z) ≤
+ C(xA | z) + C(xB | z).
We add 2C(z) to both sides of this inequality and get
C(z) + C(xA, xB, z) ≤
+ C(xA, z) + C(xB , z).
Now we make it slightly weaker,
C(z) + C(xA, xB) ≤
+ C(xA, z) + C(xB , z).
It follows
C(z) ≤+ C(z | xA) + C(z | xB) + C(xA) + C(xB)− C(xA, xB),
which is equivalent to (7), ending the proof.
Lemma 7.9. (a) For all strings w, x, y of length O(n)
C(w | x) + C(w | y) + I(x : y)− I(x : y | w)− C(w | x, y) =+ C(w)
(b) For all strings x, y, z, t of length O(n), if C(z | x, t) =+ C(z | y, t) =+ 0, then
I(x : y | z, t) =+ I(x : y | t)− C(z | t)
Proof. (a) A straightforward calculation gives
C(w | x) + C(w | y) + I(x : y)− I(x : y | w) − C(w | x, y)
=+ C(x,w) − C(x) + C(y, w)− C(y) + C(x) + C(y)− C(x, y)
− C(x,w) − C(y, w) + C(x, y, w) + C(w) − C(x, y, w) + C(x, y) = C(w)
(b) We have
I(x : y | z, t) =+ C(x, z, t) + C(y, z, t)− C(x, y, z, t)− C(z, t)
=+ C(x, t) + C(y, t)− C(x, y, t)− C(z, t) since C(z | x, t) =+ C(z | y, t) =+ 0
=+ C(x, t) + C(y, t)− C(x, y, t)− C(t) − C(z | t) the chain rule
=+ I(x : y | t)− C(z | t)
7.3 Proof of Lemma 5.6
For all xA, xB , xC , z we have
C(xA, xB , xC | z) ≤
+ C(xA | z) + C(xB | z) + C(xC | z),
which rewrites to
2C(z) + C(xA, xB , xC , z) ≤
+ C(xA, z) + C(xB , z) + C(xC , z).
Now we use the assumption that z is a deterministic function of xA, of xB , and of xC :
2C(z) ≤+ C(xA) + C(xB) + C(xC)− C(xA, xB , xC),
and the lemma is proven.
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8 Final comments
We make several considerations regarding secret key agreement protocols. They are not required for an understanding
of the main results. The next subsections can be read independently.
8.1 Time-efficient secret key agreement protocols.
The secret key agreement protocol in the proof of Theorem 4.1 is computable but highly non-efficient. The only slow
stage of the protocol is Step 2, where Bob reconstructs x given his input string y and the fingerprint px|y obtained from
Alice. At this stage, Bob has to simulate all programs of size C(x | y) until he obtains a string matching the fingerprint
px|y. All the other stages of the protocol can be implemented in polynomial time (to this end we need to use an effective
version of an extractor in the definition of fingerprints; this increases the overhead in communication complexity from
O(log n) to poly(log n), which is still negligible comparative to the size of px|y; for details see [Zim17]).
We cannot make Bob’s computation effective in general, but we can do it for some specific pairs of inputs (x, y).
Actually, we can make the entire communication protocol fast, if there is a way to communicate x from Alice to Bob
so that
• communication complexity of this stage (and therefore the information revealed to the adversary) remains about
C(x | y),
• all computations are performed by Alice and Bob in time poly(n).
Example 1. (Discussed in Introduction, p. 1.) Let Alice get a random line x in the affine plane over the finite field with
2n elements, and Bob get a random point y on this line. Formost inputs of this type we haveC(x | y) = n±O(logn),
and there exists a simple way to transfer x from Alice to Bob with communication complexity n (Alice just sends to
Bob the slope of her affine line, and Bob draws a line with this slope incident to his point). Thus, we see once again
that for this simple example there exists an effective (polynomial-time) communication protocol to agree on common
secret key of size ≈ n bits.
Example 2. Let Alice and Bob get n-bits strings x and y respectively, and the Hamming distance between these
strings is at most δn for some constant δ < 1/2. For most inputs of this type we have
C(x | y) = h(δ)n±O(log n), I(x : y) = (1− h(δ))n±O(log n),
where h(δ) = δ log 1δ+(1−δ) log
1
1−δ . Can we transfer x fromAlice to Bob with communication complexity h(δ)n+
o(n)? It turns out that such a protocol exists; moreover, there exists a communication protocol with asymptotically
optimal communication complexity and polynomial time computations, see [Smi07, GS10, GS16]. Plugging this
protocol in our proof of Theorem 4.2 we conclude that on most pairs of inputs (x, y) of this type Alice and Bob can
agree on a common secret key of size (1− h(δ))n− o(n), with poly-time computations for both parties.
8.2 On pseudo-deterministic protocols for key agreement
The communication protocols that we have analyzed (defined in Section 2.2) are randomized. In particular, this means
that, for the same pair of inputs xA, xB , Alice and Bob can end up with different values of the common secret key
z, since the result depends on the randomness used in the protocol. It seems that for all practical reasons, running
the same communication protocol twice on the same pair of inputs (but with different realizations of random bits) is
useless and even harmful: in two independent conversations, Alice and Bob would divulge too much information about
x and y. However, there remains a natural theoretical question: can we adjust the communication protocol so that for
most values of random bits, Alice and Bob agree on one and the same value of the common random key z? Such a
protocol could be called pseudo-deterministic or Bellagio protocol, similarly to the pseudo-deterministic algorithms
introduced in [Gol12].
In what follows we show that in some sense the answer to this question is positive. More precisely, we can prove
a version of Theorem 4.1 with only slightly weaker property of secrecy (we divulge O(log n) bits of information
regarding the resulting secret key) with a protocol where Alice and Bob with high probability agree on one “canonical”
value of z.
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Theorem 8.1 (Lower bound with a unique key). There exists a secret key agreement protocol with the following
property: For every n-bit strings x and y, for every constant ǫ > 0, if Alice’s input xA consists of x, the complexity
profile of (x, y) and ǫ, and Bob’s input xB consists of y, the complexity profile of (x, y) and ǫ, then, with probability
1 − ǫ, the shared secret key is a string z such that, C(z | t) ≥ |z| − O(log(n/ǫ)) and |z| ≥ I(x : y)− O(log(n/ǫ)),
where t is the transcript of the protocol.
Moreover, with probability 1− ǫ, Alice and Bob agree on one “canonical” value of z = z(x, y).
Sketch of the proof. Let us start with the simplified scheme “in a nutshell” explained on p. 9. In this protocol, we use
two randomized “digital fingerprints” of x denoted h1(x) (which is sent by Alice to Bob) and h2(x) (which is taken
as the common secret key). In the argument on p. 9 both these digital fingerprints were computed as random linear
mappings of x. Observe that the scheme works fine if the second digital fingerprint is computed in a different way,
without randomization. For example, we may assume that Alice and Bob search for the first stopping program of
length C(x) that prints x, and then take the first C(x) − C(x | y) bits of this program as the secret key.
Clearly, in every execution of the new protocol, Alice and Bob agree on one and the same value of z assuming
that, given y and h1(x) (and the complexity profile of (x, y)), Bob reconstructs correctly Alice’s input x, which is
true with probability close to 1. Moreover, it can be shown that with high probability the value of h1(x) contains only
O(log(n/ǫ)) bits of information regarding this “canonical” value of z, so the secrecy condition is preserved.
The same idea can be used to adjust the proof of Theorem 4.1, where the value of h1 is computed in a subtler way
(with randomness extractors involved in the proof of Theorem 2.2). Roughly speaking, the random “fingerprint” of
x computed in the proof of Theorem 2.2 with high probability has only negligibly small mutual information with the
fixed in advance “canonical” value of z. We omit the details.
We stress that the “secret key uniqueness” achieved in Theorem 8.1 is a property of a specific protocol, and this
property does not follow automatically from the definition of shared secret key agreement. Moreover, we can construct
a communication protocol so that on each new application of the protocol, Alice and Bob agree on a random value of
the secret key z that is uniformly distributed on the set of {0, 1}k with k = I(x : y), and, therefore, the instances of
the key z obtained in different executions of the protocol are with high probability independent with each other. (The
protocol still has a positive error probability, which means that with a small probability ǫ > 0 Alice and Bob do not
agree on a common key and accomplish the communication with different values of z.) To achieve this property, we
should modify the protocol from Theorem 4.1 as follows. First of all, Alice and Bob should agree on some common
key z using the old version of the protocol (and this z may be distributed non-uniformly). Then, Alice choses a random
bit string w of length |z| and openly sends it to Bob. At last, Alice and Bob XOR the bits of z with the bits of w. The
resulting string z′ is a uniformly distributed common secret key.
In the arguments above we used specially designed protocols. In the “standard” communication protocol defined
in the proof of Theorem 4.1 the key z is not uniquely defined by x, y, and it is not uniformly distributed either. The
specific attributes of the shared key produced by a protocol are determined by the details of the construction and by the
ratio between C(x) and I(x : y), and are positioned between the two extreme cases that we have presented above. A
more detailed analysis of generic communication protocols (e.g., a more precise estimation of I(z1 : z2) for two keys
z1 and z2 obtained in two independent realizations of the protocol from the proof of Theorem 4.1) requires subtler
considerations, and we do not discuss this question here.
8.3 Secret key agreement with an additional private communication channel
In this section, we discuss a slightly more general model of communication that combines a public and private chan-
nels. We assume that the private communication channel is not visible to the adversary. There is a naive and straight-
forward way to gain from such a channel: Alice tosses her private random coin, sends the obtained bits to Bob via this
private channel, and afterwards Alice and Bob can use these bits as a common secret key. This naive idea is actually
the optimal usage of the private channel. There is no better way to use the secret communication: if Alice and Bob are
given inputs xA and xB , and they send to each other s bits of information via the private communication, they cannot
agree (with probability 1 − ǫ) on a common secret key of complexity greater than I(xA : xB) + s + O(log(n/ǫ)).
Indeed, denote by tp the transcript of the communications via the private channel. Then the common secret z can be
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computed from (xA, rA, tp) as well as from (xB, rA, tp). It follows that
C(z) ≤+ C(z | xA, rA, tp) + C(z | xB , rB, tp) + I(xA, rA, tp : xB , rB, tp)
≤+ I(xA, rA, tp : xB , rB, tp) ≤
+ I(xA, rA : xB, rB) + C(tp)
≤ I(xA : xB) + C(tp) +O(log(n/ǫ))
≤ I(xA : xB) + s+O(log(n/ǫ))
(the third inequality holds with probability 1− ǫ).
Let us consider now a model where Alice and Bob communicate via two channels: via an ‘expensive’ private
channel of capacity s bits and a ‘cheap’ public channel of unbounded capacity (accessible to the adversary). As above,
let xA and xB be input strings of length n on which the protocol succeeds with error probability ǫ and randomness
deficiency δ(n) = O(log n), and let z be the random string that is the shared secret key output by the protocol, i.e.,
a string satisfying relations (2) and (3). We combine the simple observation above with the proof of Theorem 4.2
and conclude with the following result: with probability at least 1 − O(ǫ), if n is sufficiently large, |z| ≤ I(xA :
xB) + s+O(log(n/ǫ)).
The ‘light upper bound’ from Section 3 does not apply to the model with an additional private channel. Actually,
the traffic of size s over the private channel in some sense can be counted as an “overhead” in inequalities (14) and
(15). More precisely, we can prove a version of Lemma 3.1 with an extra term corresponding to the private channel. If
a message sent by Alice is computed as a function of its own input xA and of the data tpriv sent via the private channel,
than similarly to (14) we can prove that
I(xA : xB | f(xA, tpriv)) ≤
+ I(xA : xB) + C(tpriv).
Also, if a message sent by Alice is computed as a function of her own input xA, the publicly visible “prehistory” of
the protocol tpub (i.e., the bits sent earlier via the public channel), and of the secret part of the transcript tpriv (sent via
the private channel), then similarly to (15) we can prove that
I(xA : xB | g(xA, tpub, tpriv), tpub) ≤
+ I(xA : xB | tpub) + C(tpriv).
Using these inequalities and keeping in mind that the size of the private part of the communicationC(tpriv) is bounded
by s, we can adapt the argument from p. 11 with a suitable correction: in the chain of inequalities (16) we need to
count s bits of the “overhead” for each round of communication via the public channel. For a k-round protocol this
would give the bound |z| ≤ I(xA : xB) + ks+O(log(n/ǫ)), which is too weak for non-constant k.
We revisit these observations in Section 8.4.
8.4 Secret key agreement: the Shannon framework vs. the Kolmogorov framework
Upper and lower bounds on the size of the shared secret key. In the Introduction we discussed the general connec-
tions between IT and AIT. In what follows we discuss some more precise and formal relations between Shannon-type
and Kolmogorov-type theorems on secret key agreement.
Actually the upper and lower bounds on the size of the common key in the framework of Kolmogorov complexity
(Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2) formally imply similar bounds in Shannon’s framework for i.i.d. pairs variables and
even for stationary ergodic sources (Theorem 1 in [Tya13], see also [LYC76, BBR88, Mau93, AC93]). Indeed, it is
well known that a sequence of i.i.d. random variables (or, more generally, the outcome of a stationary ergodic source)
gives with a high probability a string of letters whose Kolmogorov complexity is close to Shannon’s entropy of the
random source (this statement was announced by L. Levin in [ZL70, Proposition 5.1] and published with proof in
[Bru82]; see also [Hor03]). Hence, if Alice gets a value of (X1, . . . , Xn), Bob gets a value of (Y1, . . . , Yn), and
the sequence of pairs (Xi, Yi) is a stationary ergodic source, then with high probability the mutual information (in
the sense of Kolmogorov complexity) between Alice’s and Bob’s individual inputs is close to the mutual information
between these two random sequences (in the sense of Shannon’s entropy).
Thus, to prove the positive statement in Shannon’s framework (Alice and Bob can agree on a secret key of size
about I(X1, . . . , Xn : Y1, . . . , Yn)) we can apply the communication protocol from the proof of Theorem 4.1. Notice
that in Theorem 4.1 Alice and Bob need to know the complexity profile of the input data; we cannot know the exact
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values of Kolmogorov complexity for a pair of randomly chosen random strings, but it is enough to provide Alice and
Bob with the known expected value of the complexity profile of their input data (see Remark 5 on p. 14). In the case
when the complexity profile of the values of X1, . . . , Xn and Y1, . . . , Yn is ‘typical’ (close to the average values),
Theorem 4.1 guarantees that the resulting common key z has a large enough Kolmogorov complexity conditional on
the transcript of the protocol. Otherwise, (in case when the complexity profile of the input data is not typical) the
result of the protocol can be meaningless; however, this happens with only a small probability. So, assuming that
Alice and Bob are given random values of X1, . . . , Xn and Y1, . . . , Yn respectively, we conclude that the outcome
of the protocol (the common secret key) is distributed mostly on strings of high Kolmogorov complexity. It is not
hard to show that such a distribution must have Shannon’s entropy (conditional on the value of the transcript) close to
I(X1, . . . , Xn : Y1, . . . , Yn).
In a similar way, our negative result (the secret common key cannot be made bigger, Theorem 4.2) implies a similar
result in Shannon’s setting. Indeed, assume that there exists a communication protocol that permits to Alice and Bob
to agree on a common secret on random inputsX1, . . . , Xn and Y1, . . . , Yn with a probability close to 1. If the pair of
random sources is stationary and ergodic, then with high probability the pair of input values has a complexity profile
close to the corresponding values of Shannon’s entropy. It follows from Theorem 4.2 that the Kolmogorov complexity
of the secret key is not much bigger than the mutual information between X1, . . . , Xn and Y1, . . . , Yn. It remains to
notice that the Shannon’s entropy of the common secret key Z (as a random variable) cannot be much bigger than the
average Kolmogorov complexity of its value (as a binary string).
In Shannon’s framework, we can consider a hybrid communication model (similar to those in Section 8.3), where
Alice and Bob can communicate via a private channel of bounded capacity (hidden from the adversary) and a public
channel of unbounded capacity (accessible to the adversary). The connection between Shannon’s and Kolmogorov’s
settings discussed above combined with the observation made in Section 8.3 implies that, in this model, Alice and Bob
cannot agree on a common secret key of entropy greater than
I(X1, . . . , Xn : Y1, . . . , Yn) + [capacity of the private channel].
Communication complexity of the protocol. Another issue that can be studied in both settings (for Shannon’s and
Kolmogorov’s approaches to the key agreement problem) is the optimal communication complexity of the protocol.
Tyagi investigated in [Tya13] this problem for the Shannon’s framework (for i.i.d. sources) and showed that in some
cases (for some distributions (Xi, Yi)) Alice and Bob need to send to each other at least
min(H(X1, . . . , Xn | Y1, . . . , Yn), H(Y1, . . . , Yn | X1, . . . , Xn))
bits of information to agree on a common secret key of size I(X1, . . . , Xn : Y1, . . . , Yn). Moreover, Tyagi found a
complete description (a so-called one letter characterization) of the optimal communication complexity for an arbi-
trary distribution on Alice’s and Bob’s inputs. This result is similar to our Theorem 6.1, which claims that Alice and
Bob need to send at least min(C(x | y), C(y | x)) bits of information to agree even on a common secret key of size
δI(x : y). However, these results are incomparable with each other (one does not follow from another):
• Tyagi investigated protocols that agree on a common secret of maximal size I(X1, . . . , Xn : Y1, . . . , Yn), while
Theorem 6.1 applies even if Alice and Bob agree on a secret of size δI(x : y) for a small δ > 0.
• [Tya13] proposed a one letter characterization of the communication complexity in terms of the distribution
(Xi, Yi), which arguably cannot be reformulated in the setting of Kolmogorov complexity.
• The result in [Tya13] applies to communication protocols with private randomness, while Theorem 6.1 is proven
only for protocols with public randomness.
One-shot paradigm. Most known results on the protocols for secret key agreement in Shannon’s framework
are proven with the assumption that the input data available to Alice and Bob are i.i.d. random variables or at least
stationary ergodic random sources. We mentioned above that for this class of inputs (stationary ergodic random
sources) the bounds on the optimal size of the secret in Shannon’s framework can be deduced from analogous results
on Kolmogorov complexity. But, actually Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 apply in more general settings. We can prove
similar bounds for random inputs obtained in one shot, without the property of ergodicity.
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In many natural instances of the secret key agreement problem, the input data are far from being ergodic, so the
classic technique does not apply. In Section 8.1, we discussed two examples of this kind: in the first one, Alice is
given a line in the affine plane, and Bob is given a point in this line; in the second one, Alice and Bob get n-bits strings
x and y respectively, and the Hamming distance between these strings is at most δn for some constant δ < 1/2. These
examples can be naturally reformulated in the probabilistic setting: we can introduce the uniform distribution on the
set of all valid pairs of inputs. For the probabilistic versions of these examples, the matching upper and lower bounds
on the size of the common secret key can be easily deduced from Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2.
To conclude, the standard results on the secret key agreement deal with the paradigm where the protocol works
properly for most randomly chosen inputs (which is typical for information theory), while in our approach we prove
a somewhat stronger statement : for each valid pair of input data the protocol works properly with high probability
(which is typical for the theory of communication complexity).
8.5 Communication protocols with logarithmic advice
In this section we show that in some setting the ‘light upper bound’ in Section 3 is more robust and flexible than the
more technical proof of Theorem 4.2.
Despite many prominent parallels between Shannon’s and Kolmogorov’s variants of information theory, there is
no canonical way to translate the basic properties from one framework to another. The rule of thumb is to substitute
Kolmogorov complexity instead of Shannon’s entropy and to change all constraints of type ‘a random variable X is
a function of a random variable Y ’ in Shannon’s case to ‘a string x has small Kolmogorov complexity conditional
on y’ in Kolmogorov’s version. For example, the classic Slepian–Wolf theorem essentially claims that, for jointly
distributedX,Y (that technically must be a sequence of i.i.d. pairs), there exists another random variable Z such that


Z is a deterministic function ofX,
number of bits in Z ≈ H(X | Y ),
X can be recovered from Y and Z with high probability.
The counterpart of this result for Kolmogorov complexity is known as Muchnik’s theorem, [Muc98]: for all strings
x, y of length n there exists a string z such that


C(z | x) = O(log n),
|z| = C(x | y) +O(log n),
C(x | y, z) = O(log n).
We can use a similar logic to translate in the language of Kolmogorov complexity the general notion of an interactive
communication protocol. A protocol adapted to the framework of Kolmogorov complexity can be viewed as a protocol
where on each step Alice and Bob get logarithmic ‘advice’ strings from a trustable Merlin.
In what follows we give a more formal definition of a protocol with advice bits. Let k be a positive integer. We
say that Alice and Bob given inputs xA an xB compute a common value z in a k-rounds protocol with q bits of advice
on each round, given inputs xA and xB , if there exists is a sequence of strings (‘messages’) x1, y1, x2, y2, . . . , xk, yk
such that
C(x1 | xA) ≤ q,
C(y1 | xB, x1) ≤ q,
C(x2 | xA, x1, y1) ≤ q,
C(y2 | xB, x1, y1, x2) ≤ q,
...
C(xk | xA, x1, y1, . . . , xk−1, yk−1) ≤ q,
C(yk | xB , x1, y1, . . . , xk−1, yk−1) ≤ q,
C(z | xA, x1, y1, . . . , xk, yk) ≤ q,
C(z | xB, x1, y1, . . . , xk, yk) ≤ q.
In a similar way, we can define the randomized protocols with advice, where Alice and Bob are given in addition
random rA and rB . For c > 0, ǫ > 0, we say that Alice and Bob (ǫ, c)-succeed on an input pair (xA, xB) to agree on
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a common secret key in a k-rounds protocol with q bits of advice, if with probability (1 − ǫ) over rA, rB , there exists
a string z such that Alice and Bob can compute common value z in a k-rounds protocol with advice as defined above,
and
C(z | t) ≥+ |z| − c logn,
where t := (x1, y1, . . . , xk, yk) is a transcript of this protocol.
Remark 17. In a conventional definition of a communication protocol, every next message sent by Alice or Bob is
computed as a function of all previous messages and of the input given to Alice or Bob respectively (this function is
one and the same for all pairs of inputs). Thus, every next message is “simple” conditional on the previous messages
and one party’s input in a very strong sense. Such a schema is unusual in the context of algorithmic information
theory, where the relation “a is simple conditional on b” is typically understood as C(a | b) ∼ log(C(a)+C(b)). This
observation motivates the given above definition of a communication protocol with advice. As a matter of fact, we
substitute the standard definition of a communication protocol by a chain of conditions “every new message is simple
conditional on the prehistory of the communication and one party’s input.” Considering this motivation, we believe
that a natural measure if “simplicity” is logarithmic (i.e., on each round of the protocol we can use O(log n) bits of
advice, where n is the length of the inputs).
Formally speaking, we might consider another communication model where the advice is provided only for some
selected rounds, while on other steps of the protocol the messages are computed in a conventional way, by a fixed
in advance deterministic function. In this case we should bound the total number of advice bits distributed over all
rounds. However, such a mixed model lacks a natural motivation.
Any conventional communication protocol (without advice) can serve as a protocol with advice strings of size
q = O(1), so the lower bound from Theorem 4.1 remains true in the new setting. Also the proof of the ‘light’ upper
bound form Section 3 applies to the protocols with advice strings of size q = O(log n), and we conclude that in the
new setting Alice and Bob still cannot agree on a common secret key of size greater than I(xA : xB). Notice that the
proof of Theorem 4.2 does not apply to protocol with advice, so we cannot extend this upper bound to non-constant
number of protocols. But this is not a real loss: the protocols with advice probably make no sense for non-constant
number of rounds (since too much information can be hidden in the bits of advice).
8.6 Weak version of negative results for multi-party protocols
In this section we prove a weak version of the upper bound on the length of the longest secret key that three parties can
agree upon. The proposed argument follows the ideas from the proof of a similar result in [CN04] in Shannon’s setting
(it is based on classic information inequalities). While this technique works pretty well in IT, in our case it covers only
the protocol with O(1) rounds and with the number of random bits bounded polynomially in the input length. Thus,
the result proven in this section is much weaker than Theorem 5.5. However, it is instructive to see how far we can go
in the setting of AIT with the classic technique borrowed from IT.
Theorem 8.2. Let us consider a 3-party protocol for secret key agreement with error probability ǫ, having a constant
number of rounds, and where the number of random bits is bounded polynomially in the input length. Let (xA, xB , xC)
be a 3-tuple of n-bit strings on which the protocol succeeds. Let z be the random variable which represents the secret
key computed from the input (xA, xB, xC) and let t be the transcript of the protocol that produces z. Then, for
sufficiently large n, with probability 1−O(ǫ),
C(z | t) ≤ C(xA, xB, xC)− CO(xA, xB, xC) +O(log(n/ǫ)),
where the constants in the O(·) notation depend on the universal machine, the number of rounds and the protocol, but
not on (xA, xB , xC).
Proof. We fix a triplet of n-bit input strings (xA, xB, xC) and we consider some randomness r = (rA, rB , rC), on
which the protocol produces a string z which satisfies the relations (23) and (24). Recall that the set of such r’s has
probability 1 − ǫ. To simplify the notation, we merge the input of each participant with the corresponding random
strong and denote
x′A := 〈xA, rA〉, x
′
B := 〈xB , rB〉, x
′
C := 〈xC , rC〉.
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Observe that with high probability the random strings rA, rB, rC are independent of xA, xB , xC , and, therefore,
C(x′A, x
′
B , x
′
C) =
+ C(xA, xB, xC) + |rA|+ |rB |+ |rC |
and
CO(x′A, x
′
B , x
′
C) =
+ CO(xA, xB, xC) + |rA|+ |rB |+ |rC |.
Thus, to prove the theorem, it is enough to show that
C(z | t) ≤ C(x′A, x
′
B, x
′
C)− CO(x
′
A, x
′
B, x
′
C) +O(log(n/ǫ)).
To this end we transform the value of C(x′A, x
′
B, x
′
C) as follows:
C(x′A, x
′
B , x
′
C) =
+ C(t, z, x′A, x
′
B , x
′
C)
=+ C(t1) + C(t2 | t1, ) + C(t3 | t[1 : 2]) + . . .+ C(t3k | t[1 : 3k − 1])
+ C(z | t) + C(x′A | z, t) + C(x
′
B | x
′
A, z, t) + C(x
′
C | x
′
A, x
′
B , z, t).
(42)
The first line follows because t and z are computed from xA, xB, xC and r, and the second line uses the chain rule.
Next, we break the sum in the right hand side of equation (42) into the sum q1(r) + q2(r) + q3(r), where the terms in
the latter sum are defined as
q1(r) := C(t1) + C(t4 | t[1 : 3]) + . . .+ C(t3k−2 | t[1 : 3k − 3]) + C(x′A | z, t)
q2(r) := C(t2 | t1) + C(t5 | t[1 : 4]) + . . .+ C(t3k−1 | t[1 : 3k − 2]) + C(x′B | x
′
A, z, t),
q3(r) := C(t3 | t[1 : 2]) + C(t6 | t[1 : 5]) + . . .+ C(t3k | t[1 : 3k − 1]) + C(x′C | x
′
A, x
′
B , z, t).
By definition of q1(r), q2(r), q3(r) and (42) we have
C(x′A, x
′
B , x
′
C) =
+ C(z | t) + (q1(r) + q2(r) + q3(r)). (43)
The following claim shows that q1(r), q2(r) and q3(r) satisfy relations similar to those that define S(xA, xB, xC).
Claim 8.3.
(1) q1(r) ≥+ C(x′A | x
′
B , x
′
C), q2(r) ≥
+ C(x′B | x
′
A, x
′
C), q3(r) ≥
+ C(x′C | x
′
A, x
′
B).
(2) q1(r) + q2(r) ≥+ C(x′A, x
′
B | x
′
C), q1(r) + q3(r) ≥
+ C(x′A, x
′
C | x
′
B), q2(r) + q3(r) ≥
+ C(x′B , x
′
C | x
′
A).
Proof of Claim 8.3. We show the first relation in (1).
C(x′A | x
′
B , x
′
C) =
+ C(t, z, x′A | x
′
B , x
′
C)
=+ C(t1 | x′B, x
′
C) + C(t2 | t1, x
′
B, x
′
C) + C(t3 | t[1 : 2], x
′
B, x
′
C)
+ C(t4 | t[1 : 3], x′B, x
′
C) + C(t5 | t[1 : 4], x
′
B, x
′
C) + C(t6 | t[1 : 5], x
′
B, x
′
C)
...
+ C(t3k−2 | t[1 : 3k − 3], x′B , x
′
C) + C(t3k−1 | t[1 : 3k − 2], x
′
B, x
′
C)
+ C(t3k | t[1 : 3k − 1], x
′
B, x
′
C)
+ C(z | t, x′B , x
′
C) + C(xA | t, z, x
′
B, x
′
C).
(44)
The first line follows from the fact that t and z are computed from xA, xB , xC and r, and the second line follows from
the chain rule.
For every ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, C(t3ℓ−1 | t[1 : 3ℓ − 2], x′B, x
′
C) =
+ 0, because t3ℓ−1 is computed from t[1 : 3ℓ −
2], x′B, x
′
C). For the same reason, C(t3ℓ | t[1 : 3ℓ − 1], x
′
B, x
′
C) =
+ 0 and C(z | t, x′B , x
′
C) =
+ 0. Eliminating the
terms that are =+ 0 in equation (44) and also the conditioning on x′B and x
′
C in all terms on the right hand side, we
obtain
C(x′A | x
′
B , x
′
C) ≤
+ C(t1) + C(t4 | t[1 : 3]) + . . .+ C(t3k−2 | t[1 : 3k − 3]) + C(x′A | z, t)
= q1(r).
The other relations in the claim are proved in a similar way.
Claim 8.3 implies that q1(r) + q2(r) + q3(r) ≥ CO(x′A, x
′
B, x
′
C). Combining this fact with relation (43), we
obtain C(z | t) ≤+ C(x′A, x
′
B , x
′
C)− CO(x
′
A, x
′
B , x
′
C), and we are done.
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8.7 Open problems
Open Question 1. In Theorem 6.1 we establish a lower bound on how many bits Alice and Bob must communicate to
agree on a common secret key. Our proof is valid only for communication protocols with public randomness. Is the
same bound true for protocols with private sources of random bits?
Open Question 2. All our communication protocols are randomized. It is natural to ask whether we can get rid
of external randomness. We conjecture that for (O(log n), O(log n))-stochastic tuples of inputs the protocol can be
made purely deterministic (though it would require very high computational complexity), but this cannot be done in
the general case. The proof of this fact would require a better understanding of the nature of non-stochastic objects
(for a discussion of non-stochastic objects see [She83] and [SUV17, Section 14.2]).
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